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Abstract
Under-vaccination is a usual concern of disease control studies. However, the equilibrium
vaccination pattern may not only deviates from social optimum by the number of vaccinations
but also the type of individuals that gets vaccinated. This paper employs a vaccination
game in a three-agent contagion network to show that it is only one of the three inefficient
patterns. Chapter 2 shows that when the network structure is incomplete or individual
characteristics are heterogeneous, there exist new types of Nash equilibrium outcomes with
either the right number but wrong set of people getting vaccinated or too many vaccinations,
and these equilibria are robust to standard refinements. However, if the pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium assigns the vaccine to some agents but not to everyone, the vaccination
game becomes anti-coordinative because everyone prefers the other agents to take the costly
vaccine. Thus, agents achieve a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Chapter 3 shows that in an
incomplete network, the central player has a greater centrality but chooses a lower vaccination
probability than the peripherals. These theoretical predictions differ from the traditional
epidemiology models, and this paper tests the various models’ predictions with U.S. workers’
flu vaccine uptake. Chapter 4 finds that among all workers, high-centrality workers are more
likely to get vaccinated than low-centrality workers. However, the difference diminishes as
we exclude health care personnel. Both the theoretical and empirical results suggest that
targeted vaccination policies on high-centrality people can improve social welfare.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Fighting contagious disease is one of the biggest challenges for human beings. Though
scientists have developed highly effective weapons such as vaccines, human beings only
successfully eradicated smallpox in 1980, and the battle against contagious diseases are very
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Therefore, understanding the human behavior
in the vaccine uptake is essential to control the contagious diseases. Thus, I develop a
new theoretical model that incorporates people’s strategic interactions and test the model’s
predictions empirically with data about U.S. workers’ flu vaccine uptake.
Chapter 2 develops the theoretical model and investigates the vaccination pattern in
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Under-vaccination is a usual concern of disease control
studies, but this chapter employs a simultaneous-move game in a three-agent contagion
network to show that it is only one of the three inefficient patterns. When the network
structure is incomplete or individual characteristics are heterogeneous, there exist new types
of Nash equilibrium outcomes with either the right number but wrong set of people getting
vaccinated or too many vaccinations, and these equilibria are robust to standard refinements.
While untargeted policies can correct the standard under-vaccination problem, targeted
policies are more palatable for correcting the new inefficiencies. Universal mandates can
never improve on any Nash equilibria.
Chapter 3 extends the investigation to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. If the
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium assigns the vaccine to some agents but not to everyone, the
vaccination game becomes anti-coordinative because everyone prefers the other agents to take
1

the costly vaccine. Thus, agents achieve a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, which has two
implications. First, in a star network, everyones vaccination probability rises as the number
of players increases, but in each specific network, the central player has a greater centrality
but chooses a lower vaccination probability than the peripherals. Second, in any network, a
universal mandate produces the same social welfare a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium does.
Chapter 4 empirically tests the model’s predictions. High-centrality individuals have
direct exposure to disease and interact with many people, so their vaccination generates
a large social benefit. But whether they are more likely to uptake vaccines is unclear.
Using data from the Occupational Information Network and the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System with restricted information on industry and occupation, we construct
a centrality measure for every occupation and estimate the effect of occupation centrality
on influenza vaccine uptake. We find that among all workers, high-centrality workers are
more likely to get vaccinated than low-centrality workers. However, the difference diminishes
as we exclude health care personnel. Such pattern suggests that high-centrality non-health
care workers are under-vaccinated, and targeted vaccination policies on them are needed to
improve social welfare.

2

Chapter 2
Equilibrium Vaccination Patterns in
Incomplete and Heterogeneous
Networks
2.1

Introduction

When it comes to vaccinations, the primary focus of the general public, the medical
profession, and academic researchers tends toward the problem of too few vaccinations.1 For
economists, under-vaccination is a straightforward example of free-riding. The individual
receiving the vaccination bears the cost of the vaccination, but by keeping him from getting
the disease, the benefits go not just to him but also to others with whom he interacts.2 Freeriding provides one explanation for why too few individuals receive vaccinations, but some
recent economic research has moved into other factors that might exacerbate this effect, with
individuals not receiving vaccinations because of misinformation or behavioral biases.3
1

For instance, in 2015 the journal Vaccine published a special issue on the topic of vaccine hesitancy, the
tendency of both patients and caregivers to become “hesitant” about vaccinations (see Hickler et al. (2015)).
2
That vaccinations have a public-good component and lead to free-riding behavior was already well-known
in public finance textbooks (Stiglitz, 1988), but Brito et al. (1991) were among the first to provide a formal
treatment. Their paper looks at tax and subsidy schemes to get the socially-optimal number of vaccinations,
and it was built upon by Geoffard and Philipson (1997) and Francis (1997). Ward (2014) and White (2018)
find empirical evidence of vaccination externalities using data on influenza vaccines.
3
Some recent experimental evidence includes Ibuka et al. (2014), which finds evidence of free-riding but
also recency bias, and Bronchetti et al. (2015), which looks at attention, planning, and follow-through for
vaccination behavior.
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This paper focuses on a different problem. We show that in an asymmetric contagion
network not only can too few people get vaccinated, but also the right number but the
wrong set of people could get vaccinated, and the possibility even arises that too many
people get vaccinated. As with free-riding, the intuition is straightforward. Suppose the
socially-optimal vaccination pattern dictates that one particular individual should be among
those vaccinated, perhaps she has the lowest vaccination cost or the highest likelihood to
spread the disease, but in equilibrium, that person does not get vaccinated. Her forgoing the
vaccine leads others with lower network externalities to get vaccinated as the best response,
and sometimes it takes more than one person to make up for the missing vaccination. These
new results show the importance not just of incentivizing vaccinations, but also of targeting
the incentives to the right individuals in an asymmetric network.
The typical large, stochastic network models capture situations where diseases spread
through random strangers. To analyze those models, researchers run simulations to find both
the socially-optimal vaccination rate and the equilibrium vaccination rate in the presence
of free-riding (see Britton et al. (2007) or Miller and Hyman (2007) for examples from the
mathematics literature; see Goyal and Vigier (2015) for an example from the economics
literature).4

In contrast, we adopt small, deterministic networks to describe situations

where diseases spread among members who expect to interact. Though the networks are
small, each member can be treated as a representative agent from a well-defined group.
We then explicitly solve a non-cooperative game for the social optima and all pure-strategy
Nash equilibria.5 These depend on the structure of the network, the cost of vaccination,
the probabilities that the individuals become infected from outside the network, and the
interpersonal transmission probabilities for the disease in the network.
Consistent with the goal of demonstrating that the problem exists, we establish it in the
simplest possible cases. Three-person networks prove sufficient. We begin with a baseline
case, a complete network in which three identical agents all have direct connections to each
4

Rao et al. (2014) looks at a different question concerning vaccinations and networks, finding evidence of
peer effects in vaccination behavior.
5
Mixed-strategy equilibria also exist, but we do not pursue them in this paper for purposes of brevity,
but the results are simple to summarize. When individuals in the network randomize between vaccinating
and not, all possible outcomes are possible including the right set of vaccinations, too few, too many, and
the right number but the wrong set. Furthermore, as with the chicken game, the mixed-strategy equilibrium
has a lower expected total payoff than the pure-strategy ones do.

4

other. The only deviations from the socially optimal vaccination pattern arise when too few
individuals get vaccinated in an equilibrium, which is the standard free-riding result. We
then introduce asymmetry in the network structure by removing a link, creating a network
in which two peripheral individuals are connected only through a central one. Vaccination
for the central player generates a larger external benefit than vaccination for a peripheral
player, and this asymmetry in the externalities leads to two new equilibrium outcomes.
In this 3-person star network, no one should get vaccinated when vaccinations are
prohibitively expensive. As the costs come down, though, the central player should be
the first to get vaccinated because he can spread the disease directly to two individuals
whereas the peripheral players can spread to just one person. However, we show that there
exist equilibria in which one of the peripheral players gets vaccinated instead of the central
one, and thus the right number but the wrong set of people get vaccinated. Moreover,
there also exist equilibria in which both of the peripheral players get vaccinated while the
central player does not. They do so because getting vaccinated is the best response to the
central player remaining unvaccinated, while the central player’s choice is the best response
to both peripheral players getting vaccinated. Under such circumstances, too many people
get vaccinated.
These new patterns of wrong-vaccination and over-vaccination arise in cases where there
are multiple equilibria, with the best equilibrium being the efficient one in which the central
player takes the vaccine. However, we show that except on a set of measure zero the inefficient
equilibria are trembling-hand perfect, and therefore survive the most common equilibrium
refinement for normal-form games. Moreover, the same patterns can arise when the network
is complete, but the individual parameters differ. Finally, we show that in a star network in
which the central player is a healthy carrier, that is, one who can transmit the disease but
suffers no ill effects of it herself, the new patterns uniquely emerge because a healthy carrier
has no incentive to vaccinate.
All of this suggests that a successful pro-vaccine program must target the agent with
the largest externality. We consider two targeted policies for the 3-person star network, a
targeted subsidy which subsidizes the vaccine for the central agent, and a targeted fine which
penalizes her for failure to vaccinate. Both policies, when administered appropriately, can
5

achieve the social optimum, and they avoid the problems of too many or the wrong set of
vaccinations by making vaccination a dominant strategy for the central player. We go on to
show that untargeted policies can also achieve the social optimum, but they do so in a much
less-straightforward way. They address the problem of free-riding with a small subsidy or
fine, but they address the problem of too many or the wrong set of vaccinations by rewarding
nonvaccination (i.e., a negative untargeted fine) or taxing vaccination (i.e., a negative
vaccination subsidy). These policies work by making nonvaccination a dominant strategy
for the peripheral players, in which case the central player best-responds by vaccinating.
However, policies incentivizing nonvaccination are unlikely to be palatable, either to
policymakers or the public at large. Surprisingly, we also find that the straightforward policy
of a universal vaccination mandate not only does worse than a targeted policy, but it also
can never do better than no policy at all. In essence, the requirements of a Nash equilibrium
leave too little room for improvement for a coarse policy like a universal mandate to work
well.
Real-world policies include both subsidies and penalties, and many of them target specific,
high-externality groups.6 For example, California Senate Bill 277 mandates that after July
2016, all children in school from kindergarten through 12th grade, all incoming college
students, and all hospital staff get certain vaccinations.7 All these individuals provide links
between otherwise unrelated individuals. Children in school provide links between parents
who would otherwise never interact, and on-campus college students provide links between
households in different communities. Hospital workers can spread diseases from patient
to patient. Also, many universities require international students to get vaccinated before
arrival, and these students face different disease exposures than others inside the college
network. Furthermore, effective July 2017 all sex workers in Germany must use condoms
(BGBl I No. 50 , Germany), which is again a mandate targeting central players in the
network that requires preventive actions against sexually transmitted diseases. Sex workers
occupy central positions in a star network with their clients on the periphery, and the policy
6

Lawler (2017) uses Canadian data to show that both government recommendations and government
mandates have positive impacts on the propensity to vaccinate.
7
Since 2013, Mississippi and West Virginia mandate vaccinations for K-12 students and recommend
vaccinations for college students, but the mandate does not apply to hospital staff. See school immunization
requirements for all states at the website of National Conference of State Legislatures.

6

targets the sex workers. The analysis in this paper highlights an unrealized benefit from
these targeted policies, which arises from avoiding inefficient behavior from the wrong people
getting vaccinated in equilibrium.
The paper has substantial differences from the existing literature, all stemming from
its explicit focus on individual behavior rather than the spread of the disease.8 We use a
static game in which all players simultaneously choose whether to get vaccinated. This game
differs from Francis (1997) in which the game is dynamic, and society eventually reaches the
social optimum after enough people become infected. In our static game the disease is not
yet present in the network, and so it best fits a situation where connected individuals make
vaccination decisions in advance, as with measles vaccinations, juvenile HPV vaccinations,
and early-season flu vaccinations.9
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the general model and identifies
conditions for a social optimum and a Nash equilibrium. Section 3 explores a 3-person
homogeneous complete network to show that the only under-vaccination can arise. Section
4 introduces asymmetry through the network structure to examine a 3-person star network
and finds that inefficiencies can arise from too few, too many, or the wrong person getting
vaccinated and also establishes when these equilibria are trembling-hand perfect. Section 5
shows that the same patterns can arise in complete and star networks with heterogeneous
payoffs and sometimes these patterns can be unique. Section 6 looks at policy implications of
incentive programs using both targeted and untargeted subsidies for vaccinating or penalties
for not vaccinating. Section 7 concludes.
8

For example, Geoffard and Philipson (1997) look at policies for the complete eradication of contagious
disease, sometimes called herd immunity, and Galeotti and Rogers (2013) look at disease spread when
there are two groups and different matching protocols. Chen and Toxvaerd (2014) analyze the impacts of
heterogeneity and strategic interaction on inefficiencies in a 3-person dynamic model. Goyal and Vigier
(2015) look at the spread of disease when agents can immunize or protect themselves in a large random
network, and Andrews and Bauch (2016) do the same using an agent-based model.
9
We consider only diseases spread by human-to-human contact and not vector-borne diseases. For those,
see Gersovitz and Hammer (2005).

7

2.2

The model: a contagion network

Consider a n-person network with members N = {1, ..., n}.10 Connections among members
are bi-directional. For two directly connected players i and j, if i catches the disease first
then i can infect j, and if j catches it first j can infect i. Individuals can only catch the
disease once.
Player i can contract the disease from outside the network with probability βi ∈ (0, 1),
which is the channel of the initial invasion of the contagion. When an individual is not
infected from outside, he still faces a probability ti ∈ (0, 1) that an infected player transmits
the disease to him through a direct connection in the network. An infection imposes a cost
of Di > 0 on the infected individual.
Individuals can get vaccinated to protect themselves from the infection, and the vaccine
is assumed to be perfectly effective, that is, a vaccinated individual cannot contract the
infection whatsoever.11 However, a vaccine is not free but costs ci ≥ 0 for each person.
Obviously, if ci > Di for every player, nobody gets vaccinated because the cost of the
vaccination outweighs the cost of getting ill.
In the game, the n players simultaneously choose whether to get vaccinated to minimize
their expected costs. The probability that individual i contracts the disease depend on who
gets vaccinated. Let piS denote the probability that player i gets infected given that the
subset S ⊆ N of the n players gets vaccinated. The perfect effectiveness of the vaccine
means that piS = 0 whenever i ∈ S.
We define S ∗∗ as the socially optimal vaccination set that minimizes the network’s total
expected cost. For a vaccinated agent i the expected cost is simply ci because vaccines
are 100% effective. For an unvaccinated individual, the expected cost is piS Di , which is the
probability of infection multiplied by the illness cost. Total expected cost sums the expected
costs over the set of individuals in the network. In cases where total expected cost remains
the same whether player i vaccinates or not, we assume that S ∗∗ includes i.
10

The setting in this section can be used for general, n-person networks, but in the subsequent sections, we
restrict analysis to the case of n = 3, and each player can be a representative agent from a well-defined group,
such as doctors and patients, teachers who move between schools and their students, or foreign travelers and
non-travelers.
11
This assumption simplifies calculations but makes no difference to the qualitative results. To incorporate
imperfect vaccines, we can add an effectiveness parameter to represent the vaccine matching rate.

8

Now consider an individual’s incentive to get vaccinated when the vaccination set is S.
In a noncooperative game, individual i conducts a cost-benefit analysis by comparing the
vaccination cost ci and the benefit of getting vaccinated. The benefit comes from not catching
the disease and equals the expected cost of contracting the disease piS−i Di given other players’
vaccination set S − i, where S − i denotes the subset S with i removed. Assume individuals
are risk-neutral. If ci < piS−i Di agent i’s expected cost from remaining unvaccinated exceeds
the cost of getting vaccinated, and so i chooses to vaccinate. If ci > piS−i Di , then i chooses
to remain unvaccinated because vaccination is too expensive. If ci = piS−i Di , then i is
indifferent between these two, and we assume that agents elect to vaccinate whenever they
are indifferent.
Based on the above decision rules, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game consists
of a subset S ∗ ⊆ N of vaccinated individuals such that everyone in S ∗ weakly prefers
to vaccinate, and everyone not in S ∗ weakly prefers not to. In other words, in a purestrategy equilibrium, no vaccinated player would be better off forgoing vaccination, and
no unvaccinated player would be better off getting vaccinated. Mathematically, the first
condition means that if i ∈ S ∗ then ci ≤ piS ∗ −i Di so that i’s expected costs of going
unvaccinated and possibly getting the disease exceed the cost of getting vaccinated. The
second condition means that if i ∈
/ S ∗ then ci > piS ∗ Di so that for i the cost of vaccination
exceeds the expected cost of catching the disease.

2.3

Symmetric structure: a complete network

We begin with the benchmark case of a 3-person homogeneous complete network in
which everyone interacts with everyone else (completeness), and everyone has the same
exogenous parameters, namely the infection probability β, the transmission probability t,
the vaccination cost c, and the disease cost D. We refer to the case of identical exogenous
parameters as homogeneity.
We can find complete networks in households, classrooms, and apartments. Individuals
interact in small groups in these places, so they know the members. Moreover, though we
explicitly refer to members as individuals, they can be representative agents from exclusive
9

groups. For example, at a community gathering, each member is a household representative.
Connections exist among households, but only the representatives interact.
The complete network serves as a good benchmark for two reasons. The first is that it
is entirely symmetric in that every player has the same number of connections and, in the
absence of vaccinations, the same probability of illness. The second is that, as we will show,
Nash equilibrium behavior can only deviate from the social optimum in one direction, with
too few vaccinations.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. Suppose that the vaccination cost c is
low enough for it to be socially optimal to vaccinate two people but too high to vaccinate all
three. Those two vaccinations benefit not only the people who get them but also the other one
by eliminating his risk of getting infected from members in the network. The social optimum
takes this external benefit into account, but individuals do not when deciding whether to
get vaccinated in a noncooperative equilibrium. If the social benefit of vaccination makes it
optimal for two players to get vaccinated but the private benefit does not, we end up with
only one vaccinated, i.e., free-riding.
To establish the existence of free-riding in equilibrium, we compare the socially-optimal
vaccination set S ∗∗ to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium vaccination set S ∗ . If #S ∗ < #S ∗∗ ,
we have free-riding, where #S denotes the number of elements of S. The symmetry of both
the network structure and the external infection probabilities means that only the number of
players in S, and not which ones they are, matters for determining social costs. Vaccinated
players have zero probability of infection, but pay the vaccination cost c. An unvaccinated
player i does not pay c but has expected cost piS D when the set S of players get vaccinated.
We now go on to compute piS for different numbers of players in S.
First consider the case in which i is the only unvaccinated player, that is, S = {j, k}
and #S = 2. Then i can only contract the disease by external infection, so pi{j,k} = β. If
only one of the other two get vaccinated, say j, so that #S = 1, i can contract the disease
by external infection or through a one-step transmission from the other unvaccinated player
(k → i). Thus
pi{j} = β + (1 − β)βt.
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The first term is the probability that i contracts the external infection himself (β). The
second term is the probability that he does not get the external infection (1 − β) times the
probability that the other unvaccinated player k gets it (β) times the probability that k
transmits the disease to him (t). Finally, if #S = 0, i.e., none of the others get vaccinated,
i can contract the disease by external infection or interpersonal transmission from j by one
step (j → i) or two steps (j → k → i). Hence, i’s probability of contracting the disease
when #S = 0 is
pi∅ = β + 2(1 − β)2 β(t + t2 − t3 ) + (1 − β)β 2 (2t − t2 ).
The first term is the exogenous infection (β). The second term accounts for when i and k
are not exogenously infected ((1 − β)2 ) but j is (β), i may get infected from j through j → i
by one step (t) or j → k → i by two steps (t2 ) but not both (t3 ). Since j can be any of the
other two players, multiply this probability by 2. The third term accounts for when i is not
exogenously infected (1 − β) but both j and k are (β 2 ), i may get infected through j → i or
k → i by one step (2t) but not both (t2 ). Notice that in a 3-person homogeneous complete
network, pi{i} < pi{j,k} < pi{j} < pi∅ .12
The social cost arising when the players in S get the vaccine is

ΠS =




3c






2c + pi D
{j,k}



c + 2pi{j} D





3pi D
∅

if #S = 3
if #S = 2
(2.1)
if #S = 1
if #S = 0

The first lemma shows the social optima for various vaccination costs.

β



= β + 2(1 − β)2 β(t + t2 − t3 ) + (1 − β)β 2 (2t − t2 ) = pi{j} + (1 − β)β 2 t2 + 2(1 − β) (1 − t) − (1 − t)2 +

1 − (1 − t)2 > pi{j} because 1 > (1 − t) > (1 − t)2 .

12 i
p
 ∅
2
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Lemma 2.1. Assume that βt < 2/3. In a 3-person homogeneous complete network, the
socially-optimal set of vaccinated individuals is given by

S ∗∗ =




{1, 2, 3}






{j, k}



{j}





∅

h

i

if

c
D

∈

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

i

∈ pi{j,k} , 2pi{j} − pi{j,k}

i
i
i
i
i
∈ 2p{j} − p{j,k} , 3p∅ − 2p{j}


∈ 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} , ∞

0, pi{j,k}

(2.2)

Proof. In appendix.
The lemma contains some intuitive results, but also a less-intuitive one. As intuition
would suggest when the normalized vaccination cost c/D is very low everyone should get
vaccinated, and when it is very high, no vaccinations are efficient. As the cost of vaccination
rises, fewer people should get the vaccine in the social optimum. The less-intuitive result is
that vaccination may be efficient even when the vaccine costs more than the illness (c/D > 1)
because one vaccination reduces the probability that the disease spreads in the network, and
the social optimum internalizes this external benefit.13
The condition βt < 2/3 guarantees that 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} > 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} , so S = {j} can be
socially optimal. It implies that the disease is not too communicable, but removing it does
not affect the qualitative result.14
The next lemma shows the Nash equilibria for various vaccination costs.
13

For example, when β = 0.7 and t = 0.8, the social optimum has everyone vaccinated when c/D ≤ 0.7,
two people vaccinated when 0.7 < c/D ≤ 1.036, one person vaccinated when 1.036 < c/D ≤ 1.1381, and no
one vaccinated when c/D > 1.1381.
14
If βt ≥ 2/3, the inequality may not hold so 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} ≤ 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} . Then if Dc ∈

i

i
pi{j,k} , 32 pi∅ − 12 pi{j,k} , S ∗∗ = {j, k}; and if Dc ∈ 32 pi∅ − 12 pi{j,k} , ∞ , S ∗∗ = ∅. Note 32 pi∅ − 12 pi{j,k} ∈
i

3pi∅ − 2pi{j} , 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} .
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Lemma 2.2. In a 3-person homogeneous complete network, the pure-strategy equilibrium set
of vaccinated individuals is given by

S∗ =




{1, 2, 3}






{j, k}



{j}





∅

h

i

if

c
D

∈

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

i

∈ pi{j,k} , pi{j}

i
i
i
∈ p{j} , p∅

∈ pi∅ , ∞

0, pi{j,k}

(2.3)

Proof. In appendix.
Juxtaposing the two lemmas allows us to identify inefficient outcomes, that is, values of
c/D for which the Nash outcome S ∗ differs from the socially-optimal outcome S ∗∗ . Figure
2.1 illustrates the inefficient outcomes with a numerical example by comparing the size of
vaccination sets in the social optimum and the pure-strategy equilibrium.
The main result from this section of the paper confirms the conventional thinking, finding
that in general, too few members may get vaccinated because individuals do not take the
external benefit of getting vaccinated into consideration.

Figure 2.1: Inefficient outcomes in a 3-person homogeneous complete network with β =
.05, t = .8, D = 1. The horizontal axis represents the vaccination cost from 0 to ∞, and
the numbered shadings represent the number of vaccinations, with the top shadings above
the white midline corresponding to the social optimum and the bottom shadings below
corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. Darker colors represent more vaccinations than
lighter ones.
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Proposition 2.3. Assume that βt < 2/3. In a 3-person homogeneous complete network,
too few individuals get vaccinated in a pure-strategy equilibrium when the vaccination cost
i
i 

c
i
i
i
i
i
i
−
2p
,
3p
∪
p
−
p
,
2p
∈
p
{j} . Otherwise, the correct number of individuals
∅
∅
{j,k}
{j}
{j}
D
get vaccinated.
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 2.3 is the result one would expect from the traditional theory of public goods
when there are free riders. Furthermore, it emphasizes that individuals with full information
may deliberately decline to get vaccinated. These are not new results, though. In the next
two sections, we add asymmetries to the network to find sources of inefficiency different from
free-riding.

2.4

Asymmetric structure: a star network

In a 3-person star network, player 1 directly connects to both players 2 and 3, but players
2 and 3 do not directly connect to each other. Player 2 can still pass a disease to player
3, and vice versa, but now the transmission must go through the central player 1. Central
players can be doctors, nurses, teachers, flight attendants, international travelers, and people
with multiple sexual partners.15 In particular, a doctor examines many patients while these
patients do not directly interact. Furthermore, each player can be a representative agent
from exclusive groups. When a patient goes to a hospital, he expects to meet some doctor
from that hospital. Similarly, a doctor expects some patient from nearby communities.16
15

Though we define the central player as the one who has the most connections to facilitate our analysis,
solely comparing players’ degree of connections can be problematic in a complex network. We can still
calculate every player’s infection probabilities under all vaccination sets to reveal whose vaccination generates
the largest external benefit. However, such calculation can become exponentially complicated in an n-person
network, since each player faces 2n−1 different vaccination sets. See Jackson (2008) for alternative centrality
measures.
16
Despite the fact that networks may be larger than the ones we consider and consequently network
structure might also be more difficult to observe, we emphasize the positive aspects of our results rather than
their normative aspects. The positive aspects highlight the potential over-vaccination in a Nash allocation,
while the normative aspect emphasizes who should first vaccinate. (Section 6 goes on to illustrate normative
conclusions from these results.) Regardless, in a complex network, we usually can find a central subgroup
to demonstrate the relevance of positive aspects of our qualitative results.
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In this section, we show that free-riding is not the only potential source of inefficiency
in the contagion network. It is possible for the right number but the wrong set of people to
get vaccinated in equilibrium, and it is also possible for too many people to get vaccinated
in equilibrium.
Assume homogeneity, as in the benchmark model, that all players have the same
exogenous infection probability β, the same transmission probability t, the same vaccination
cost c, and the same disease cost D. The game is asymmetric, though, because of the network
structure: the central player 1 has two connections, but the peripheral players 2 and 3 have
only one each. This asymmetry affects who should get vaccinated in the social optimum. If
only one person is vaccinated, it should be player 1 because all disease transmission must go
through her. There exist equilibria, though, where player 1 chooses not to get vaccinated, but
players 2 and 3 get vaccinated themselves as the best response, resulting in an inefficiently
large number of vaccinations.
First, consider the central player 1’s probability of contracting the disease. As before, if
1 gets vaccinated, her probability of infection is 0. If 1 remains unvaccinated, the probability
depends on what the peripheral players 2 and 3 do. If both get vaccinated, then 1 can only
catch the disease from outside the network, which occurs with probability β. If one of the
two gets vaccinated, 1’s probability of infection is p1{i} = β + (1 − β)βt, which is the same as
in the complete network when one person gets vaccinated. If none of the peripheral players
get vaccinated, besides external infection, 1 can contract the disease by 1-step transmission
from 2 or 3, but not both, so 1’s probability of infection is
p1∅ = β + (1 − β)(2βt − β 2 t2 )
where the tern 2βt − β 2 t2 reflects that infection can be transmitted to 1 from two people
(2βt) but cannot be transmitted from both (β 2 t2 ). Notice that p1{1} < p1{2,3} < p1{i} < p1∅ .17
Next, consider a peripheral player i’s probability of contracting the disease, i = 2, 3. If
he vaccinates himself, his probability of infection is 0, and if player 1 gets vaccinated, his
probability of infection is β. If 1 does not get vaccinated, but the other peripheral player j
17 1
p∅

= β + (1 − β)(2βt − β 2 t2 ) = p1{i} + (1 − β)βt(1 − βt) > p1{i} .
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does, then the possible transmission exists between 1 and i. Player i can contract the disease
either from outside the network or from player 1, for a probability of pi{j} = β + (1 − β)βt,
which is the same as in a complete network with one vaccination. Finally, if neither 1 nor
j gets vaccinated, then besides external infection, he can contract the disease by 1-step
transmission from 1 (1 → i) or by 2-step transmission from j (j → 1 → i), so his probability
of infection is


pi∅ = β + (1 − β) βt + (1 − β)βt2
where the term in brackets represents that i can get infected from 1 by one step (1 → i)
(βt) or from j by two steps (j → 1 → i), conditional on that 1 is not exogenously infected
((1 − β)βt2 ). Notice that pi{i} < pi{1} < pi{j} < pi∅ < p1∅ .18
Summing over the three members of the network yields expected social costs:



3c








2c + βD



ΠS = c + 2βD






c + 2pi{j} D







 p1 + 2pi D
∅
∅

if #S = 3
if #S = 2
if S = {1}

(2.4)

if S = {2} or {3}
if #S = 0

The next lemma shows the optimal allocation and the equilibrium allocation of
vaccination programs for different values of the vaccination cost, holding β and t constant.
Lemma 2.4. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, the socially optimal set of vaccinated
individuals is given by

S ∗∗




{1, 2, 3}



= {1}





∅

if

c
D

∈ [0, β]

if

c
D

if

c
D


∈ β, p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β)

∈ p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β), ∞

(2.5)

Proof. In appendix.


= β + (1 − β) βt + (1 − β)βt2 = pi{j} + (1 − β)2 βt2 > pi{j} and p1∅ = β + (1 − β)(2βt − β 2 t2 ) =
pi∅ + (1 − β)βt(1 − t) > pi∅ .
18 i
p∅
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When the vaccination cost is huge, no one gets vaccinated. When the cost falls enough
for one individual to get the vaccine, the social optimum assigns it to player 1 because doing
so removes any possibility of the disease spreading between players 2 and 3 if one of them
gets sick. Vaccinating player 3 instead of player 1 raises the possibility that the disease
spreads between 1 and 2. Thus, vaccinating a peripheral player instead of the central one
increases expected social cost by 2(pi{j} − β) = 2(1 − β)βt > 0. Also, as with the benchmark
case of the complete network, it is possible that vaccination is efficient even when it costs
more than the illness.19
The next lemma identifies the pure-strategy Nash equilibria for different values of the
vaccination cost. In some cases, there are multiple equilibria.
Lemma 2.5. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, the pure-strategy equilibrium set of
vaccinated individuals is given by



{1, 2, 3}








{1} or {2, 3}



S ∗ = {1} or {2} or {3}






{1}






∅

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

∈ [0, β]

i
∈ β, pi{j}
i

∈ pi{j} , pi∅

∈ pi∅ , p1∅

∈ p1∅ , ∞

(2.6)

Proof. In appendix.
When the normalized vaccination cost c/D is below the probability of external infection
β everyone gets vaccinated in equilibrium. When it is higher than the probability of infection
with none vaccinated, p1∅ , nobody gets vaccinated. For values of c/D in between there is
an equilibrium in which only the central player 1 takes the vaccine. But, when c/D is at
the lower end of this interval, there are two Nash equilibria, the socially-efficient one in
which 1 gets vaccinated and the socially-inefficient one where both 2 and 3 get vaccinated
instead. In this range, (β, pi{j} ], there exists an equilibrium in which too many people get
19

For example, when β = 0.4 and t = 0.6, the social optimum prescribes that player 1 get vaccinated when
0.4 < c/D ≤ 1.0451. The reason for this is player 1’s vaccination creates a positive externality for players 2
and 3, and this externality lifts the entire benefit of the vaccination beyond the cost of a single illness.
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vaccinated. Similarly, when c/D is in the middle of the interval there again exist two types
of Nash equilibria, an efficient one vaccinating player 1 and an inefficient one vaccinating
either player 2 or 3 instead. In the range (pi{j} , pi∅ ], then, there exists an equilibrium in which
the right number but the wrong set of people get vaccinated. Figure 2.2 illustrates this for
a star network in which β = 0.05, t = 0.8, and D = 1. And we generalize the results from
this example in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6. In a 3-person homogeneous star network,
(a) there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which too few individuals get vaccinated

when Dc ∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) ;
(b) there exist pure-strategy equilibria in which the right number but the wrong set of
i

individuals get vaccinated when Dc ∈ pi{j} , pi∅ ; and
(c) there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which too many people get vaccinated when

i
c
i
∈
β,
p
{j} .
D
Proof. In appendix.

Figure 2.2: Inefficient outcomes in a 3-person homogeneous star network with β = .05, t =
.8, D = 1. Same settings as in Figure 2.1 except that the shadings highlight the members
in S ∗∗ and S ∗ ; the orange shading with {2} also includes {3}.
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Proposition 2.6 is the most novel finding of the paper. It shows that under an asymmetric
network structure, for some range of the vaccination cost it is socially optimal to vaccinate
only the central player 1, but there exist pure-strategy equilibria vaccinating one or both of
the two peripheral players instead. Furthermore, the proposition shows that the asymmetries
in a 3-person star network are sufficient to generate three patterns of inefficient vaccine
allocations and not just the usual one of too few vaccinations.
Comparing Propositions 2.3 and 2.6 shows that the network structure has an impact on
the incidence of free riding. In a complete network free riding occurs when the equilibrium
vaccination set is one person smaller than the socially optimal set, and this can occur
when there are either two or one socially-optimal vaccinations.20 Lemma 2.4 shows that
two vaccinations are never socially optimal in a star network, and three vaccinations are
only socially optimal when the cost of the vaccination is lower than the external infection
probability β. Thus, the only instance of free riding in the star network arises when player
1 is supposed to get vaccinated, but nobody takes the vaccine.
Because the existence of multiple equilibria drives the new sources of inefficiency in a
vaccination network, it is worth exploring whether these inefficient equilibria are robust to
standard refinements. The next proposition shows that, except at the right endpoints of the
relevant intervals, all of the equilibria are trembling-hand perfect.
Proposition 2.7. In a 3-person homogeneous star network,
(a) S ∗ = {1} is trembling-hand perfect when

c
D


∈ β, p1∅ ;

(b) S ∗ = {2} or {3} is trembling-hand perfect when
(c) S ∗ = {2, 3} is trembling-hand perfect when

c
D

c
D



∈ pi{j} , pi∅ ; and



∈ β, pi{j} .

Proof. In appendix.
At the right-hand limit of each of the intervals in the proposition the individuals in
the equilibrium vaccination set are indifferent between vaccinating and not. For the case of
S ∗ = {2, 3}, when c/D = pi{j} , if player 1 remains unvaccinated players 2 and 3 are indifferent
20

The equilibrium vaccination set is possible to be two members smaller than the socially optimal set. See
the proof for Proposition 1.
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between vaccinating and not. A tremble for player 1 consists of a small probability of
vaccinating, and that small probability tips players 2 and 3 to strictly prefer to remain
unvaccinated. Thus, the inefficient Nash equilibrium is not robust to trembles at that
endpoint. To the left of the endpoint, though, players 2 and 3 strictly prefer vaccinating
to not vaccinating, and a sufficiently small tremble by player 1 cannot overcome the strict
preference. Consequently, except on a set of measure zero all of the Nash equilibria are also
trembling-hand perfect equilibria.

2.5

Asymmetric payoffs in complete and star networks

Section 2.4 introduced asymmetry in the network structure, but the standard way to bring
asymmetry into a game is through either the move timing or the payoffs. It is hard to imagine
how a sequential vaccination game would play out, though, because no one can commit to
no vaccination. There are usually opportunities to vaccinate later, in which case the choice
is between “vaccinate now” or “do not vaccinate yet,” but not between “vaccinate now”
or “never vaccinate.”21 Therefore this section explores the various channels of payoff-based
asymmetries that give rise to the new types of inefficient outcomes, and also establishes
scenarios in which these outcomes result in a unique Nash equilibrium.
Begin with a 3-person heterogeneous complete network by allowing individuals to have
different disease costs Di , but the same exogenous susceptibility, transmission probability,
and vaccination cost. This setting reflects that people with poor health, such as seniors and
children, are more likely to suffer a severe sickness when infected with a contagious disease
than healthy adults. With this illness severity asymmetry, the social optimum first allocates
a vaccination to the high-cost individual whenever the vaccination cost is low enough for
at least one person to get vaccinated. As the next proposition shows, though, there exist
inefficient allocations in which others get the vaccine instead.
21

One can still address the question of whether making the game sequential has any impact on the results.
The outcome depends on who moves first. If there is a Nash equilibrium in which (i) the first mover does
not have a dominant strategy to vaccinate, and (ii) there exists of Nash equilibrium in which not some but
not all players get vaccinated, then the first mover will choose not to get vaccinated. If the first mover is
the one with the largest positive externalities, such as the central player in the star network, then letting
that player move first guarantees an inefficient outcome. On the other hand, having that player move last
guarantees that the individual generating the greatest external benefit takes the vaccine.
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Proposition 2.8. In a 3-person complete network with D1 > D2 = D3 , there exists a purestrategy equilibrium in which the right number but the wrong set of individuals get vaccinated
i
i 

when c ∈ βD1 , p2{3} D2 ∪ p2{3} D1 , p2∅ D2 , given the existence of such intervals.
Proof. In appendix.
In the first interval two individuals take the vaccine in both the social optimum and the Nash
equilibrium, and the inefficiency arises when the high disease-cost agent 1 is not among the
vaccinated. In the second interval only one agent takes the vaccine, and the inefficiency arises
when agent 1 is not the one who takes it. Unlike with the star network, there is no issue
with too many vaccinations here because in a complete network there exist socially-optimal
allocations with two vaccinations, but in a star network there do not.
Because the ratio between the disease cost and the vaccination cost determines the
equilibria and the social optima, a similar outcome arises in the same network with
heterogeneous vaccination costs ci . In the social optimum the individual with the lowest
vaccination cost takes the vaccine first, assuming that the cost is low enough for anyone
to vaccinate. However, there exists equilibrium in which others get vaccinated instead.
Such vaccination cost asymmetry captures differences in insurance status, travel cost, and
philosophical beliefs.
Proposition 2.9. In a 3-person complete network with c1 < c2 = c3 , there exists a purestrategy equilibrium in which the right number but the wrong set of individuals get vaccinated
i
i


c1 c2
c1 c2
2
2
2
when D , D ∈ β, p{3} or D , D ∈ p{3} , p∅ , given the existence of such intervals.
Proof. In appendix.
In the first interval two agents take the vaccine and in the second interval one agent does,
and the inefficiencies arise because the low-cost agent 1 remains unvaccinated.
While the asymmetry in Proposition 2.6 comes from the shape of the network, the
asymmetries in Propositions 2.8 and 2.9 involve individual costs. The asymmetries can also
come from the transmission probabilities and the external infection probabilities. Consider
heterogeneous transmission probabilities first. Let ti denote the probability that the disease
is transmitted to player i by one of the other two players, and assume that agent 1’s
21

transmission probability is the highest. Such transmission heterogeneity might reflect that
agent 1 is a highly susceptible individual who is at a high risk of becoming infected, such
as seniors, children, and pregnant women. The transmission probability differences create
an incentive for the social planner to vaccinate the individual with the greatest transmission
probability. As the next proposition demonstrates, there exist Nash equilibria in which
someone other than the most-susceptible person gets vaccinated.
Proposition 2.10. In a 3-person complete network with t1 > t2 = t3 , there exists a

i
c
1
2
Nash equilibrium in which the wrong person gets vaccinated when D ∈ p{2} , p∅ , given
the existence of such an interval.
Proof. In appendix.
The ineffiency arises because either player 2 or 3 gets vaccinated in equilibrium but social
cost is lower when the highly-susceptible player 1 gets vaccinated instead. Note that when
two players get vaccinated transmission between agents becomes impossible, and so the
proposition only concerns the case of one vaccination.
To complete the scope of asymmetry sources, suppose that the agents have different
external infection probabilities, with agent 1 being most susceptible to infection from outside
the network. Thus, agent 1 is the most likely individual to introduce the disease to the
network, and the social optimum allocates a vaccination to him whenever the vaccination
cost is sufficiently low. Such heterogeneity could arise because, for example, agent 1 travels
more than the others or comes into contact with more strangers than the others. The next
result shows that inefficiencies can arise in this setting as well.
Proposition 2.11. In a 3-person complete network with β1 > β2 = β3 , there exists
a pure-strategy equilibrium in which too many individuals get vaccinated when c/D ∈

n
o
i
2
3
max β1 , 2p{1} − β2 , p{2} , and the right number but the wrong set of individuals get

i
vaccinated when c/D ∈ p1{2} , p2∅ , given the existence of such intervals.
Proof. In appendix.
This proposition shows that both types of inefficiency, either from the wrong set of
vaccinations or from too many vaccinations, can occur in a complete network.
22

Propositions 2.6 and 2.8-2.11 demonstrate that any source of asymmetry in the network,
whether from differences in the parameters or from the shape of the network itself, can lead
to Nash equilibria with too many or the wrong set of vaccinations. In all of these cases the
inefficiencies arise because there are multiple Nash equilibria, and the incorrect allocations
can be avoided if the network selects a more efficient equilibrium. We finish this section with
an example in which there are not multiple equilibria and the unique equilibrium vaccination
allocations differ from the social optimum by having either too many or the wrong agents
vaccinate.
To do this, we combine two types of asymmetry. Consider a 3-person star network in
which the central player is a healthy carrier who remains healthy even after being infected,
so her disease cost is zero but she still can transmit the disease to others.22 The healthy
carrier does not have any incentive to vaccinate, so no Nash outcome includes includes her
in the equilibrium vaccination set. However, the social planner prefers to vaccinate the
carrier because of her central position in the star network. Because of this, the only Nash
equilibrium outcomes are inefficient, as shown in the next proposition.23
Proposition 2.12. In a 3-person star network with D1 = 0 < D, c1 = c − βD for c > βD,
there exist unique inefficient equilibrium outcomes
(a) that too many individuals get vaccinated when

c
D

∈



β, p2{3}

i

; and

(b) that the right number but the wrong set of individuals get vaccinated when

c
D

i

∈ p2{3} , p2∅ .

Proof. In appendix.
22

Typhoid Mary, who was the first person in the U.S. identified as a healthy carrier of the typhoid
fever pathogen, infected 51 people but lived for nearly three decades in isolation. Also, for the human
papillomavirus (HPV), which contains more than 100 types of sexually transmitted viruses, some infected
people show no symptoms, but others are diagnosed with cancer.
23
When the number of members increases, we can obtain this outcome with homogeneous vaccination
costs. In an n-person star network (n > 3) with the central player being a healthy carrier, holding other
parameters identical, there exists a unique
inefficient outcome

i that too many individuals get vaccinated in
n−1
1
a pure-strategy equilibrium for c/D ∈ n−2 β, β + (1 − β)βt , which only requires (1 − β)t > n−2
.

23

2.6

Targeted and untargeted vaccination policies

Section 3 shows that when the network is complete and the parameters homogeneous,
inefficiencies arise only from the familiar free-riding problem, with too few individuals taking
the vaccine. Section 4 shows, however, that when the network is not complete, inefficiencies
can arise with either the wrong individuals or too many individuals getting vaccinated.
Section 5 demonstrates that the same patterns can arise when the network is complete,
but the parameters reflecting disease or vaccination costs or transmission probabilities or
exogenous susceptibilities are heterogeneous. In all cases, the inefficiencies arise because
either the network structure or the parameter values make it least socially costly when one
particular individual takes the vaccine, but that individual goes unvaccinated in the Nash
equilibrium. Below we refer to this individual as the high-externality individual, reflecting
that in the star network vaccinating the central player 1 provides larger positive externalities
than vaccinating either of the two peripheral players. This suggests that targeting the central
player could be a useful policy feature, and we explore targeted and untargeted policies in
this section. In particular, we focus on the homogeneous star network.24
Analyzing a targeted policy requires precise definitions of its objectives because there may
exist two or more Nash equilibria but only one inefficient equilibrium for some parameter
values. Therefore, we define the worst equilibrium S̄ as the inefficient Nash allocation with
the central player 1 ∈
/ S̄ when multiple Nash outcomes exist. Since player 1 chooses not to
vaccinate in S̄, it must be the case that c > p1S̄ D, that is, the vaccination cost is greater than
his expected illness cost given members of S̄ getting vaccinated.
However, a policymaker must motivate player 1 to get vaccinated because the efficient
equilibrium requires vaccinating the central player. Two straightforward options are available
to revert player 1’s choice: subsidizing her vaccination or penalizing her for not getting
vaccinated. To be specific, the subsidy s must be sufficient to motivate her to vaccinate
anyway, or c − s ≤ p1S̄ D; and the penalty f also must be sufficient to prevent her from
forgoing the vaccination, or c ≤ p1S̄ D + f .
24

Results similar to those in this section hold for the heterogeneous complete networks and the star network
with a healthy carrier.
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Motivating the central player is not sufficient to justify the policy, though, and the social
planner must also demonstrate that the policy incurs smaller cost than benefit to the network.
In particular, the administrative cost g to implement the policy must be no greater than the
social cost savings, or g ≤ ΠS̄ − Π{1} .25 Therefore, we define a policy as a potential social
improvement if the Nash equilibrium with the policy generates a weakly smaller expected
social loss than the worst Nash equilibrium without the policy.
Next, we use these criteria to analyze the subsidy first and then the fine. A targeted
subsidy s constitutes a potential social improvement from the undesirable equilibrium
allocation S̄ if s ≥ c − p1S̄ D and g ≤ ΠS̄ − Π{1} . That is, the subsidy is large enough
to induce player 1’s vaccination but incurs smaller administrative cost than the cost saving
by that vaccination.
Proposition 2.13. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, a subsidy s to the central
player that incurs an administrative cost g constitutes a potential social improvement if


(a) s ≥ c − p1∅ D and g ≤ p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) D − c when
(b) s ≥ c −

pi{j} D

and g ≤

2(pi{j}

∈



β, pi{j}

i

− β)D when

(c) s ≥ c − βD and g ≤ c − βD when

c
D

∈



c
D

c
D


∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) ;

pi{j} , pi∅

i
;

.

Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 2.13 is best understood by juxtaposing it with Proposition 2.6. The region
in condition (a) corresponds to too few vaccinations, that is, where the socially efficient
allocation is for player 1 to get vaccinated but in the unique Nash equilibrium, nobody gets
it. Condition (b) concerns cost levels for which the right number but wrong set of individuals
get vaccinated, and condition (c) looks at the region in which too many individuals get
vaccinated. Proposition 2.13 shows that in all three cases a targeted subsidy can overcome
the source of inefficiency throughout the region in which it occurs.
A targeted nonvaccination fine works in the same way. A targeted fine f constitutes a
potential social improvement from S̄ if f ≥ c − p1S̄ D and g ≤ ΠS̄ − Π{1} . That is, the fine is
25
The government budget does not include the spending of the subsidy or the revenue of the fine because
subsidies and fines are transfers within the network.
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large enough to make getting the vaccine more attractive than forgoing it but incurs smaller
administrative cost than the cost saving by that vaccination.
Proposition 2.14. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, a fine f to the central player
that incurs an administrative cost g constitutes a potential social improvement if


(a) f ≥ c − p1∅ D and g ≤ p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) D − c when
(b) f ≥ c − pi{j} D and g ≤ 2(pi{j} − β)D when
(c) f ≥ c − βD and g ≤ c − βD when

c
D

c
D

c
D


∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) ;

i

∈ pi{j} , pi∅ ;


i
∈ β, pi{j} .

Proof. In appendix.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the results of Propositions 2.13 and 2.14 using the same parameters
as in Figure 2.2. The dashed magenta line shows the worst Nash equilibrium outcome for

Figure 2.3: Policy comparisons in a 3-person homogeneous star network with β = .05, t =
.8, D = 1. The y-axis is the expected social cost, and the x-axis is the vaccination cost.
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various values of the vaccination cost.26 The solid blue line shows the Nash equilibrium
outcome with a targeted subsidy or fine, where it optimizes to be zero when the vaccination
cost is either very low or very high, and it coincides with the social optimum. The distance
between the magenta and blue lines demonstrates the upper bound of the administrative
cost that can justify the targeted policy. Finally, the solid black line shows the social cost
from a universal mandate where all members get vaccinated.
The figure does not show the best Nash equilibrium outcome because that line would
always coincide with one of the other ones already shown. It coincides with the solid blue
line from zero to the right-most vertical portion of the dashed magenta line, and it coincides
with the magenta line from there on. The best Nash equilibrium has the central player 1
getting the vaccine until costs reach a level in which no one gets vaccinated. A targeted
subsidy or penalty can correct player 1’s failure to internalize the externalities.
Our policy analysis shows that both a targeted subsidy and a targeted fine can achieve
the socially-optimal allocation of vaccinations. It is worth noting, though, that a subsidy can
do this through a Pareto improvement, while a fine cannot. Player 1 prefers equilibria where
others get vaccinated instead of her, while the peripheral players prefer the equilibrium where
only player 1 vaccinates. A subsidy that induces player 1 to vaccinate instead of one or more
peripheral players can make everyone better off. A fine, in contrast, makes the peripheral
players better off by moving them to a preferred allocation, but even though she does not
pay the fine in equilibrium, it makes player 1 worse off by moving her to a less-preferred one.
Both targeted policies avoid the problem of too many or the wrong vaccinations by
making vaccination a dominant strategy for the central player 1, in which case the two
peripheral players best-respond by remaining unvaccinated unless c ≤ β. For untargeted
policies, though, any policy that makes vaccination a dominant strategy for player 1 also
makes it a dominant strategy for the two peripheral players. Because of this, untargeted
vaccination policies allow for the same multiple-equilibrium inefficiencies that arise without
a policy.
26

The figure is constructed so that when two or more lines coincide exactly, the dashed magenta line is
always drawn on top and the solid black line is on the bottom, so if the black or blue lines are hidden, they
coincide with the magenta one.
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Figure 2.2 illustrates how this works for a subsidy. An untargeted subsidy s effectively
lowers the vaccination cost from c to c − s and therefore can be shown in the graph by a
leftward movement. The problems of vaccinating too many or the wrong people arise when

(c − s)/D ∈ β, pi∅ , where s is the subsidy, and there are multiple equilibria throughout this
region. The only way to get a unique Nash equilibrium with only player 1 getting vaccinated
is to have a negative subsidy, or a tax, on the vaccine. A tax would make vaccination more
expensive, not less, and is quite counterintuitive.
The more intuitive notion of a positive subsidy improving social welfare arises when
the vaccination cost is beyond p1∅ so that the Nash equilibrium has no vaccinations, but
the efficient outcome prescribes a vaccine to the central player. An appropriate untargeted
subsidy can reduce the vaccination cost to between pi∅ and p1∅ , in which case the central
player vaccinates in the unique Nash equilibrium.
An untargeted fine for remaining unvaccinated works similarly. A fine of f raises the
cost of remaining unvaccinated from piS D to piS D + f , and the individual chooses to remain
unvaccinated if c > piS D + f , which is isomorphic to c − f > piS D. So an untargeted fine
works the same way as an equal-sized untargeted subsidy. As with the subsidy, a positive
untargeted fine can improve the situation in which there are too few vaccinations, but the fine
must be negative to avoid situations with too many or the wrong vaccinations. This negative
fine would be a reward for those who remain unvaccinated, which is again counterintuitive.
Proposition 2.15. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, assuming the administrative
cost g is sufficiently small, the following policies constitute potential social improvements:
(a) an untargeted vaccination subsidy or nonvaccination fine when
(b) an untargeted vaccination tax or nonvaccination reward when

c
D
c
D


∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2 pi∅ − β ;

∈ β, pi∅ .

Proof. In appendix.
Part (a) governs situations in which nobody gets vaccinated even though it is socially
optimal for the central player 1 to take the vaccine. The untargeted vaccination subsidy
or untargeted nonvaccination fine works by reducing the effective vaccination cost enough
for player 1 to get vaccinated in equilibrium but not enough for the other, less efficient
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equilibria to arise. Part (b) governs situations in which either too many or the wrong people
take the vaccine, and the policies work by making nonvaccination a dominant strategy for
the peripheral players 2 and 3 and inducing player 1 to best-respond by vaccinating.
Stark contrasts arise between the targeted and untargeted policies.

The targeted

policies avoid situations of too many or the wrong vaccinations by making vaccination a
dominant strategy for player 1, and the policies do so through straightforward vaccination
subsidies or nonvaccination fines.

Untargeted policies avoid these same outcomes by

making nonvaccination a dominant strategy for the peripheral players, and they do so
through counterintuitive vaccination taxes or nonvaccination rewards. To address the new
inefficient patterns identified in this paper, then, targeted policies have easy-to-understand
and politically feasible parameters, while untargeted policies would be difficult for agencies
to explain and sell to the public.
One policy that we briefly mentioned in Figure 2.3 is a universal mandate, which can
be regarded as an untargeted fine large enough to induce everyone to vaccinate. The figure
shows that the universal mandate can never do better than the worst Nash equilibrium.
That it does worse than an appropriate targeted policy is no surprise because the universal
mandate obtains more vaccinations than that are socially optimal. However, that it does no
better than no policy at all may be a surprise to some. The next proposition shows that such
relationship discovered in the homogeneous star network is completely general, covering any
network with any amount of heterogeneity.
Proposition 2.16. For any n-person network and any Nash equilibrium allocation S ∗ with
#S ∗ < n, the expected social cost is lower in the equilibrium than with a universal mandate;
that is, ΠS ∗ < ΠN .
Proof. In appendix.
In a Nash equilibrium some agents go unvaccinated because for them the vaccination
cost is higher than the expected cost of facing the disease. So their collective expected cost
from facing the disease is lower than the sum of their vaccination costs, which they would
have to pay under a universal mandate. Consequently, the only time a universal mandate
can do as well as a Nash equiilibrium is when everyone gets vaccinated in equilibrium, and
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that only occurs when ci < βi for everyone in the network. Thus, while universal mandates
are straightforward to implement because everyone must make the same choice, they are far
from the most efficient policy.

2.7

Conclusion

This paper departs from the conventional theoretical treatment of vaccination in contagion
networks by examining small, explicit networks rather than large, random ones. Doing so
allows us to identify all Nash equilibria of the vaccination game, and that in turn leads
to some new results. The most striking result is that when the network has asymmetries,
either from the structure of the network itself or heterogeneity in the agents’ payoffs, undervaccination is no longer the only possible inefficient outcome. In some cases there exist
multiple equilibria, and while the efficient equilibria have the high-externality agent taking
the vaccine, the inefficient equilibria have other, lower-externality agents taking it instead.
Situations then arise in which the right number but wrong set of people get vaccinated, and
also in which too many people get vaccinated. These results are new in the literature.27
The potential problem of too many vaccinations arises from the existence of multiple
equilibria, and it arises despite the fact that an individual vaccination might still be socially
optimal even if the individual’s cost of taking it exceeds his cost from actually catching
the disease. The multiple equilibria arise because if the high-externality individual goes
unvaccinated, others in the network best-respond by getting vaccinated, and it might take
more than one of them to make up for the unvaccinated, high-externality person’s choice.
The model allows for policy analysis, and the paper considers four: targeted subsidies,
targeted fines, untargeted subsidies, and untargeted mandates. These policies can correct
the allocation inefficiencies, but only the targeted policies do so in a straightforward manner
by changing the behavior of the high-externality player. For example, a targeted subsidy can
avoid the equilibrium in which the two peripheral players in a star network take the vaccine
27

In general, the literature relies on models with random networks where every possible connection
is possible with a given probability. From the standpoint of our model, this makes the traditional
network complete. When agents are otherwise homogeneous, the only inefficient equilibria involve too few
vaccinations, a result consistent with our Proposition 2.3. Thus, the new results in our paper arise from
departures from complete, homogeneous networks.
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instead of the central player, and it does so by making vaccination a dominant strategy
for the central player. Untargeted policies, on the other hand, may take a counterintuitive
and unappealing form. Using the same example, the appropriated untargeted policy to
avoid an equilibrium in which the peripheral players get vaccinated would take the form of
an untargeted vaccination tax. This tax would make remaining unvaccinated a dominant
strategy for the peripheral players, and the central player would best-respond by taking the
vaccine.
The paper also shows that untargeted fines severe enough to induce everyone to vaccinate
not only does worse than a targeted policy, they never perform better than no policy at all.
While the analysis in this paper makes one wary of such universal mandates, in practice
these mandates can have real effects. For example, Carpenter and Lawler (2017) find those
mandatory vaccination requirements for middle schoolers in 46 U.S. states have increased
not only vaccine take-up for the required diseases, but also for other diseases. The issue
identified in this paper is that if we can identify the structure of the network, there are
lower-cost solutions through targeting.
The paper provides proof-of-concept that asymmetric network structure can lead to new
patterns of inefficient vaccination allocations, and future work can explore other networks.
A fruitful path might begin with linked asymmetric networks, such as those in which the
central players in two separate star networks connect to each other. For policy analysis,
though, the primary implication of the paper is not that universal mandates lead to more
vaccinations, but that they result in too many, and so policymakers should conduct a rational
benefit-cost analysis of vaccination programs.
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Chapter 3
Network Centrality and Vaccination
Probability
3.1

Introduction

The network centrality measures an agent’s importance in disease spread. A high-centrality
agent usually has more connections and a greater infection risk than a low-centrality agent.
If vaccines are available, a typical compartment model in epidemiology predicts that in a
random network, the high-centrality agent is more likely to take the vaccine than the lowcentrality agent.1 However, vaccines are costly, and one’s vaccination generates an external
benefit to others. Thus, if agents have the incentive to avoid the vaccination cost and to
gain the external benefit, they will forgo their vaccination to free ride others.2 This paper
applies a game-theoretical model to investigate the strategic interaction among agents with
heterogeneous centralities.
This paper confirms a positive correlation between a player’s centrality and vaccination
probability as a network expands but finds a negative correlation across players in a specific
network. Both results are derived in the star network where one central player directly
1

The simplest compartment model consists of three compartments: susceptible, infectious, and recovered.
See an overview at Hethcote (2000).
2
Classic public finance textbooks, such as Stiglitz (1988), have clearly identified the vaccination’s external
benefit. That is, an individual pays a private cost to be vaccinated, thus benefitting not only herself but
also the public. Ward (2014) and White (2018) provide empirical evidence supporting the flu vaccine’s
externality. Ibuka et al. (2014) also find evidence in a lab experiment.

32

interacts with many peripheral players; thus, the central player has a greater centrality than
peripheral players do. Adding one extra peripheral player increases all existing players’
centrality and the probability of vaccination in the corresponding mixed-strategy Nash
equilibria . However, in a specific star network, the central player chooses a lower probability
of vaccination than peripheral players in the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Such
a result contradicts the compartment model’s prediction.
This paper builds on Neilson and Xiao (2018)’s stylized network model. Network members
are agents who expect to interact so they can form expectations about each other’s response.
Agents can contract the disease from either outside or inside the network, but they only
consider the strategic response of agents in the network.3

Moreover, members can be

individuals (e.g., relatives, friends, colleagues, and sexual partners) or representative agents
from well-defined groups (e.g., service providers and customers as well as males and females
in a heterosexual relationship). Finally, an agent can pay to vaccinate herself before the
disease enters the network and spreads. The vaccination cost and the expected illness cost
determine an agent’s payoff. Agents simultaneously choose whether to vaccinate to maximize
their payoffs.
The vaccination game is anti-coordinative within some range of the vaccination cost.
Consider a network with two identical agents, i.e., a 2-person complete network. Each agent
has two strategies: vaccinate or not vaccinate; thus, there are four potential outcomes: both
are vaccinated, none is vaccinated, one is vaccinated but the other is not, and vice versa.
Both want to get vaccinated if the cost is small, while none wants to get vaccinated if the
cost is large. However, if the vaccination cost is in a medium range where no dominant
strategy exists, in the equilibrium one agent gets vaccinated while the other does not. Since
the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium prescribes one vaccination, if one agent knows the other
3
The small, deterministic network can explain the behavior of individuals if they contract diseases from
acquaintances, while the large, random network is suitable if infections spread among strangers. Chen and
Toxvaerd (2014) proposes a three-person model, but their analysis stays within Francis (1997)’s dynamic
framework and only investigates a complete network. Cerdeiro (2017) find that with a durable protection
technology, such as a vaccine, the extent of protection monotonically increases in the population density.
Epidemiologists use an agent-based model to simulate complex interaction patterns. For example, DePasse
et al. (2017) consider that agents interact with family at home and with other households at the workplace
or school. Mathematics studies, including Britton et al. (2007) and Miller and Hyman (2007), usually focus
on the disease spread in a large network and the effective strategies to stop the spread.
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is vaccinated, she will free ride; but if the other is not vaccinated, she will take the vaccine
to avoid the high risk of infection. Both agents prefer the other person to take the vaccine,
but it is impossible for both to free ride. Therefore, a conflict arises regarding who does
free ride. Game theorists refer to games with such a conflict as the chicken game, and the
conflict leads to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium whereby everyone wants to make the
other agent indifferent.
An application of the 2-person network to the heterosexual relationship can best explain
the mixed equilibrium’s indifference property. Consider one male and one female interacting
in a casual relationship.4 Both individuals can contract a sexually transmitted disease from
each other or from sexual partners outside the network.5 Individuals can take a vaccine or
use condoms to avoid the disease and to prevent transmitting the disease to each other, but
vaccination or condom use is costly.6 Therefore, individuals desire an equilibrium in which
they can balance the trade-off between the cost and the benefit of disease prevention, and
such an equilibrium must be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Agents’ centralities are also the same in the symmetric equilibrium. However, if players
have heterogeneous centralities, an asymmetric equilibrium arises. Consider a star network in
which one central player directly interacts with many peripheral players while the peripherals
do not interact with each other. The star network can be applied as a special case in
which one female interacts with many males or vice versa. Thus, the central player has a
greater centrality and a greater infection risk than the peripherals. First, as the number of
players increases, both the central and the peripheral players’ probabilities of vaccination
increase. That result is consistent with the compartment model’s prediction about a positive
correlation between centrality and vaccination probability.

However, in a specific star

network, the central player chooses a lower probability of vaccination than the peripherals
4
If assume males and females do not interact with agents of the same gender, the 2-person complete
network is equivalent to a bipartite network with two sets of agents. See discussions about bipartite networks
in Galeotti and Rogers (2013) and Goyal and Vigier (2015).
5
An agent in the 2-person network considers other sexual partners’ response as an exogenous parameter
because they are outside the network. The 3-person star network endogenizes a thrid agent’s strategic
response.
6
Vaccination against the sexually transmitted diseases are available, such as the Human papillomavirus
(HPV) vaccine and the Hepatitis B vaccine. Also, consider condom use as a long-term commitment of using
comdoms in every sexual encounter since agents play a simultaneous-move game.
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in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. That result is driven by the equilibrium’s indifference
property. To make everyone indifferent about either vaccinating or forgoing, the peripheral
players must raise their probability of vaccination to offset the central player’s high infection
risk; and the central player responds with a lower probability of vaccination. The negative
correlation between centrality and vaccination probability within a star network is a novel
result.
The equilibrium outcomes provide insights into empirical evidence about flu vaccination
and condom use. First, workers in occupations with frequent public contact are more likely
to be high-centrality individuals, but their flu vaccination coverage may be less than their
customers’. For example, fewer workers in education, training, and library occupations get
the flu vaccine than schoolchildren (38.8% vs. 55.6%) (CDC, 2013, O’Halloran et al., 2017);
and if the vaccination is not required, fewer health care personnel get the flu vaccine than
adult residents in long-term care facilities (44.7% vs. 73.7%) (CDC, 2016, 2017).7 Secondly,
in the casual heterosexual relationship, condom uses frequency may not increase with the
number of sexual partners. Anderson et al. (1999) find that in a casual relationship, U.S.
adults with two to five partners are more likely to use condoms at the last sex encounter than
those with one partner (68.8% vs. 53.5%). However, individuals with six or more partners
do not use condoms more frequently (51.5%). In conclusion, the game-theoretical model
provides insights into the observed negative correlation between centrality and vaccination
probability in flu vaccination and condom use, that strategic interaction leads to unexpected
results.
Targeting the vaccine to high-centrality agents prevents them from strategically free
riding others and generates the greatest external benefit to society. However, if targeted
policies are not politically feasible, a universal mandate becomes palatable because it treats
7
If the health care personnel in long-term care facilities are required to get the flu vaccine, their vacciantion
rate is 87.4%. O’Halloran et al. (2017) also find that for the non-health care personnel, occupations with
frequent public contact typically have a vaccination rate lower than the national adult average rate of 40%,
including education, training, and library (38.8%), community and social services (38.3%), management
(34.6%), personal care and service (29.3%), sales (27.3%), and food preparation and serving (21.9%). The
sample mean vaccination coverage of non-health care personnel is 29.7%. The data are collected from 21
states using the 2013 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System survey administered by Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC). Luckhaupt et al. (2014) find similar results using the 2009 National H1N1
Flu Survey data.
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everyone the same. Moreover, a universal mandate results in the same social welfare as
a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium’s indifference property, an
individual must earn the same payoff whether she vaccinates or not. Thus, she earns
the same payoff by either choosing the pure strategy to get vaccinated or choosing the
probability mixture of vaccinating and forging. The same equality applies to everyone;
therefore, whether everyone gets vaccinated or everyone chooses the probability mixture, the
network’s aggregate payoffs are the same. To conclude, a universal mandate is desirable
if individuals cannot coordinate, and policymakers prefer paying the fixed vaccination cost
rather than facing the potential disease spread.8
This paper contributes to the economics literature of epidemics and protection in terms of
three perspectives. First, this paper expands the understanding of the strategic interaction
in the vaccination game. The earlier literature emphasizes vaccination programs cooperative
feature that disease eradication requires policy intervention and international cooperation
(Geoffard and Philipson, 1997, Barrett, 2003). Recent literature indicates the vaccination’s
substitutability between groups (Galeotti and Rogers, 2013, Goyal and Vigier, 2015). This
paper applies the chicken game to highlight the anti-coordinative aspect of the vaccination
game .
Secondly, this paper broadens insight into the correlation between social activeness and
protection incentives. Goyal and Vigier (2015) have developed a model to study the trade-off
between interaction and protection and find a positive correlation between social activeness
and disease protection. They also find that if two groups have heterogeneous returns from
interaction, the high-return group is more socially active and invests more in protection
than the low-return group. This paper finds not only a consistent result that an agent’s
probability of vaccination increases as her centrality increases, but also a new result that in
a star network, the high-centrality agent chooses a relatively low probability of vaccination.
Finally, this paper lends support to compulsory vaccination policies. Brito et al. (1991)
argue that the competitive equilibrium is always better than the universal mandate because
those who forgo the vaccine in the equilibrium are worse off under the mandate. Neilson
8

A universal mandate is also preferable if the vaccination cost is very low, compared to the disease cost. In
this case, vaccinating everyone is socially optimal. But since everyone has a dominant strategy to vaccinate,
a universal mandate cannot improve the equilibrium.
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and Xiao (2018) formally show that the argument holds if players coordinate. This paper
finds that if they cannot coordinate, the universal mandate produces the same welfare that
a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium does.
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the 2-person benchmark model.
Section 3.3 uses a 2-person network to demonstrate the vaccination game’s anti-coordination
and the existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Section 3.4 introduces the 3-person
star network. Section 3.5 finds the mixed equilibrium in the star network and presents
the counter-intuitive outcome that the high-centrality agent chooses a lower probability of
vaccination than low-centrality agents do. Section 3.6 analyzes the universal vaccination
mandate and finds the same social welfare as in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Section
4.6 concludes the paper.

3.2

The benchmark model: a 2-person complete network

The benchmark model is a 2-person version of Neilson and Xiao (2018)’s network model,
which is a complete network by definition because everyone interacts with everyone. Consider
two risk-neutral players i and j in a network, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Player i can contract the
contagious disease from outside the network or from the other player j in the network. If
player i involves in community activities or exposes to natural virus carriers, she may get
infected and introduce the disease to the network. The probability of such infection is β.
The infected player can transmit the disease to the healthy player j with a probability of t.
Each player can catch the disease only once. Illness costs the infected player D. Meanwhile,
individuals can choose to pay a cost c to vaccinate before the disease enters the network. For
example, a flu vaccine is available before the flu season, a juvenile HPV vaccine is available
for teenagers, and condoms are available all the time. Assume the vaccine is 100% effective.
Both players compare the cost and benefit of vaccination and decide whether to vaccinate
simultaneously. The benefit depends on the expected cost of forgoing vaccination, which
equals the probability of infection multiplied by the illness cost. piS is defined as player
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i’s probability of infection when players in S are vaccinated, and the vaccination set S
determines the probability. Since the vaccine is perfect, if i is vaccinated, pi{i} = 0. However,
if i forgoes vaccination, then j’s action determines the probability. If j is vaccinated, then
pi{j} = β,
where β implies that player i can only get infected from outside because j’s vaccination
eliminates the risk that the disease transmits from j to i. However, if j is also not vaccinated,
then
pi∅ = β + (1 − β)βt,
where β represents the exogenous susceptibility and (1 − β)βt represents that if i is not
infected exogenously, j gets the infection and transmits it to i. Since (1 − β)βt is also
the difference between pi{j} and pi∅ , (1 − β)βtD represents the external benefit for i of j’s
vaccination. Notice that pi{i} < pi{j} < pi∅ . The payoff matrix is summarized:
Player 2
Player 1

V
N

V
−c, −c
−p1{2} D, −c

N
−c, −p2{1} D
−p1∅ D, −p2∅ D

In the matrix, V represents vaccinating while N represents not vaccinating. In each element,
the first term is player 1’s payoff while the second is player 2’s. Notice that p1{2} = p2{1} = β.
Knowing the vaccination’s cost and benefit, players choose the action that minimizes
their costs. That action depends on the relative scale of c and D. If the vaccine cost is very
low, or c ≤ βD, then each player has a (weakly) dominant strategy to vaccinate because
c ≤ pi{j} D < pi∅ D. If the vaccine cost is very high, or c > pi∅ D, then each player has a
dominant strategy to forgo vaccination because c > pi∅ D > pi{j} D. If the vaccine cost is in
between, or βD < c ≤ pi∅ D, then players do not have a dominant strategy. Also, players’
preferences are unstable. If j is vaccinated, then i’s best response is to forgo the vaccination
because c > pi{j} D. However, if j is not vaccinated, then i’s best response is to vaccinate
because c ≤ pi∅ D. This paper focuses on the last circumstance with no dominant strategies,
which leads to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (mixed-strategy NE).
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3.3

The chicken game and the mixed equilibrium

First, consider the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (pure-strategy NE) in the 2-person
complete network, if no dominant strategy exists. In a pure-strategy NE, agents choose
either to vaccinate or not with no incentive to deviate. For example, if βD < c ≤ pi∅ D, two
pure-strategy NEs exist: agent 1 vaccinates while 2 does not, and agent 1 forgoes while 2
vaccinates. In each equilibrium, the forgoing agent is better off than the vaccinated agent
because −pi{j} D > −c. Thus, each agent prefers the equilibrium with her being a forgoing
agent. Such ex-post preference indicates that both agents want to free ride. Economists
categorize such anti-coordinative games as the chicken game.9
The anti-coordinative nature of the vaccination game leads to the mixed-strategy NE. If
agents cannot coordinate, each agent chooses a strategy profile (θi , 1 − θi ), where θi is agent
i’s probability of vaccination. Then the vector (θ1∗ , θ2∗ ) defines a mixed-strategy NE such
that both agents cannot be strictly better off by choosing a different probability mixture. To
achieve the equilibrium, each agent must be indifferent about vaccinating and not against
the other agent’s strategy profile. The first proposition defines an equilibrium that satisfies
such a condition.

Proposition 3.1. In a 2-person homogeneous network, if c/D ∈ β, pi∅ , in a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium both players choose the probability of vaccination
θ∗ = 1 −

c/D − β
.
(1 − β)βt

Proof. By symmetry, let θ1∗ = θ2∗ = θ∗ . And θ∗ solves the following equation:
θβD + (1 − θ)[β + (1 − β)βt]D = c.
9

(3.1)

In the chicken game, two players drive towards each other to challenge their nerves. If one player swerves
but the other does not, the one who swerves is a “chicken” , while the other is a winner. However, if both
go straight, they crash and both are injured. Thus, if a driver knows that the other will swerve, he wants
to go straight to win; but if the other goes straight, he prefers to swerve to avoid a crash. Both the chicken
and the vaccination games are anti-coordinative since players compete for a rivalrous resource and sharing
the resource is costly. In the chicken game, winning is a rivalrous resource because only one player can win.
However, if both players want to win, they are injured in the crash. Similarly, in the vaccination game,
free-riding is a rivalrous resource because only one player can free ride. However, if both want to free ride,
they face a greater risk of illness.
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The full proof is in appendix.
Proposition 3.1 highlights the mixed-strategy NE’s existence in the vaccination game,
thus laying the foundation for the rest of the paper. The proposition also provides two
insights. First, an individual is more likely to vaccinate as the vaccination cost falls or
as the illness cost rises if other parameters are constant. Such relationship is consistent
with the intuition that people are more likely to take the vaccine as it becomes cheaper.
Secondly, individuals are indifferent to choosing a probability mixture versus taking the
vaccine. As equation (3.1) shows, the equilibrium requires player i to be indifferent about
vaccinating and not against the player j’s strategy profile. Since the vaccine is perfect, her
payoff is the negative vaccination cost, or −c, no matter she vaccinates or not. If player
i mixes between vaccinating and forgoing, her payoff still is −c. Thus, player i’s expected
payoff of choosing any probability mixture equals the vaccination cost if player j chooses the
equilibrium strategy profile. Since i and j are substitutable, both players choose the same
strategy profile in equilibrium.
An application of the 2-person network to the heterosexual relationship can best explain
the mixed equilibrium’s indifference property. Consider one male and one female interacting
in a casual relationship. Both individuals can contract a sexually transmitted disease from
each other or from sexual partners outside the network. However, an individual can take
a vaccine or use condoms to avoid the disease and therefore not transmit the disease to
the other individual. Thus, individuals desire an equilibrium in which they can balance the
trade-off between the cost and the benefit of vaccination.
In a casual relationship, such an equilibrium must be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Assume that everyone prefers not to take a vaccine (or sex without condoms) if there is no
infection risk and contraception concerns are irrelevant. Thus, individuals do not want to
bear the vaccination cost if they can have safe sex in a casual relationship. Moreover, a female
is unlikely to coordinate with a causal boyfriend on whether to take a vaccine. Furthermore,
individuals desire an equilibrium in which they choose a vaccination probability to make
each other indifferent about whether to vaccinate. For example, if the male’s vaccination
probability is too low, the female’s infection risk is very high; thus, she must take a vaccine
and let the male free rides her. However, if the male’s vaccination probability is too high,
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the female will never vaccinate so she can free ride the male; thus, the male dislikes the
allocation. Therefore, everyone must choose the probability mixture that makes the other
individual indifferent. In conclusion, individuals achieve a symmetric equilibrium if they
have the same infection risk from outside the network, the same probability to transmit the
disease within the network, the same vaccination cost, and the same illness cost.

3.4

A 3-person star network

Adding one player to the 2-person network creates a 3-person network. If everyone directly
interacts with everyone, they form a complete network. But if only one player directly
interacts with everyone else, they form a star network. The one interacting with two players
is defined as the central player. The others, who directly interact with the central player but
not with each other, are defined as the peripheral players. This section focuses on the star
network.10
The central player has a greater centrality than the peripherals.11 Central players usually
can be found in socially active occupations, such as waitresses, teachers, and social workers.
A waitress serves customers seated at separate tables. A teacher teaches students in various
classrooms and schools. A social worker interacts with people from different households and
communities.
Start with players’ payoffs. Refer the central player as player 1 (female) and the peripheral
players as players 2 and 3 (male). If player 1 takes the perfect vaccine, her payoff is −c
because p1{1} = 0. However, if she forgoes vaccination, her expected payoff is the probability
of infection multiplied by the illness cost, with the probability depending on the peripheral
players’ action. If both peripheral players are vaccinated, then p1{2,3} = β because she can only
catch the disease from outside. If one of the peripherals is vaccinated, then p1{i} = β+(1−β)βt
for i = 2, 3 because she can catch the disease either exogenously or from the other member.
10

I skip the 3-person complete network because all results are qualitatively the same as those in a 2-person
network.
11
Choosing which specific centrality measure does not matter in a star network since all measures assign
a higher score to the central player. This paper essesntially uses the probability of infection to rank the
players, and the calculation is similar to the decay centrality (see Jackson (2008)).
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If none of the players are vaccinated, then
p1∅ = β + (1 − β)(2βt − β 2 t2 ),
where 2βt − β 2 t2 represents the possibility that either of the two peripherals (but not both)
can transmit the disease to player 1. Notice that p1{1} < p1{2,3} < p1{i} < p1∅ .
Next, if a peripheral player i = 2, 3 takes the perfect vaccine, his payoff is −c because
pi{i} = 0. However, if he does not, his probability of infection depends on what player 1 and
the other peripheral player j do. If player 1 is vaccinated, pi{1} = β since player 1 is i’s only
connection and her vaccination eliminates all interpersonal transmission in the network. If
player 1 forgoes the vaccine but j takes it, then pi{j} = β + (1 − β)βt because he can catch
the disease either exogenously or from player 1. If none of the players are vaccinated, then
pi∅ = β + (1 − β)[βt + (1 − β)βt2 ],
where βt + (1 − β)βt2 represents that i gets the disease from other players by either one step
(1 → i) or two steps (j → 1 → i). Notice that pi{i} < pi{1} < pi{j} < pi∅ < p1∅ .
Players choose whether to vaccinate to minimize their costs. And their decisions may
involve a conflict on coordination as in the chicken game. Consider the pure-strategy NEs
outlined in Neilson and Xiao (2018):



{1, 2, 3}
if








{1} or {2, 3}
if



S ∗ = {1} or {2} or {3} if






{1}
if






∅
if

c
D
c
D
c
D
c
D
c
D

∈ [0, β]

i
∈ β, pi{j}

i
∈ pi{j} , pi∅

∈ pi∅ , p1∅

∈ p1∅ , ∞

(3.2)

First, consider the two extreme cases. Players have a dominant strategy to vaccinate
if the normalized vaccination cost (c/D) is very low and a dominant strategy to forgo the
vaccine if the cost is very high. These two circumstances correspond to the first and last
equilibria in equation (3.2). As the cost falls below p1∅ but is greater than pi∅ , the peripheral
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players have a dominant strategy to forgo. Knowing that none of the others will vaccinate,
the central player must take the vaccine. Thus, the equilibrium prescribes the vaccine to

player 1 if the cost is in pi∅ , p1∅ .

Next, as the normalized vaccination cost continues to fall into β, pi∅ , no dominant
strategies exist, resulting in multiple equilibria. Vaccinating the central player is socially
optimal. However, in the lower part, the equilibria prescribes the vaccine either to the
central player or to the two peripheral players. While in the upper part, any player taking
the vaccine is a pure-strategy NE. In this circumstance, players cannot agree on which
equilibrium to coordinate. Since a player forgoes the vaccine if the expected illness cost
is smaller than the vaccination cost, all players must prefer an equilibrium with others
vaccinated to the equilibrium with themselves vaccinated. The next section will show that
the difficulty of coordinating results in a mixed-strategy NE, where the central player chooses
a lower probability of vaccination than the peripherals.

3.5

The central player and equilibrium vaccination
probability

Section 2 introduces the 2-person network. Section 3 shows that a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium exists in the 2-person network. Section 4 suggests such a mixed-strategy NE can
also exist in the 3-person star network. This section uses the equilibrium outcome to show
the main result that the central player is less likely to vaccinate than the peripherals.
In a 3-person vaccination game with no dominant strategies, each agent chooses a strategy
profile (θi , 1 − θi ) for i = 1, 2, 3. And the vector (θ1∗ , θ2∗ , θ3∗ ) defines a mixed-strategy NE,
whereby everyone must be indifferent to vaccinating and forgoing against the others’ strategy
profiles. The next proposition defines an equilibrium satisfying such a condition.12
12

All players mix their strategies in this equilibrium, but asymmetric mixed-strategy solutions also exist.
In such solutions, one player commits to non-vaccination, while the other two mix their strategies to achieve
a Nash equilibrium. See details in Appendix B.1.
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Proposition 3.2. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, for c/D ∈ (β, c̄], there exists a
mixed-strategy NE in which the central player chooses the probability of vaccination
θ1∗ = 1 −

c/D − β
p
,
(1 − β)(1 − (1 − c/D)(1 − β))t

and both peripheral players choose the probability of vaccination
θ2∗

=

θ3∗

=1−

1−β−

p
(1 − c/D)(1 − β)
,
(1 − β)βt

p
where c̄ = β +(1−β)t− 12 (1−β)3 t2 − 12 (1−β)2 t (1 − β)2 t2 + 4 − 4t that solves θ1∗ (c/D) = 0.
Proof. By symmetry, θ2∗ = θ3∗ . And θ1∗ and θ2∗ solve the following equations:
(θ2 )2 · p1{2,3} D + 2θ2 (1 − θ2 ) · p1{2} D + (1 − θ2 )2 · p1∅ D = c,

(3.3)

θ1 · p2{1} D + (1 − θ1 )θ2 · p2{3} D + (1 − θ1 )(1 − θ2 ) · p2∅ D = c.

(3.4)

The full proof is in appendix.
Proposition 3.2 offers similar insights as well as a significantly different insight into
Proposition 3.1 of a 2-person network. The mixed-strategy NE’s interval does not extend

fully to β, pi∅ , where the multiple pure-strategy NEs exist, but is bounded above by some
threshold below pi∅ because as the normalized vaccination cost approaches the threshold from
the left, the central agent’s probability of vaccination goes to zero. However, the peripheral
agents’ probability is still positive.13 Thus, the central agent is less likely to vaccinate than
the peripheral agents at the threshold. The next proposition shows that such a relationship
holds whenever a mixed-strategy NE exists, which is the main result of this paper.
Proposition 3.3. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, as in the mixed-strategy NE
described in Proposition 3.2, the central player chooses a lower probability of vaccination
than the peripheral players, that is
θ1∗ < θ2∗ = θ3∗ .
13

Substitute θ1 = 0 in equation (3.4) and obtain θ2 · p2{3} D + (1 − θ2 ) · p2∅ D = c. Since p2{3} D < c < p2∅ D,
one can verify that 0 < θ2 < 1.
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Proof. In appendix.
Figure 3.1 illustrates Proposition 3.2 and 3.3’s results using parameters β = .05, t =
.8, D = 1. The dashed magenta curve shows the central player’s probability of vaccination,
and the solid blue curve shows the peripherals’. The two curves highlight a surprising
result: the central player’s probability of vaccination is always smaller than the peripherals’,
though she faces a relatively greater infection risk than the peripherals. The intuition is that
everyone’s expected illness cost must equal the vaccination cost because of the equilibrium
’s indifference property (equations (3.3) and (3.4)). To make the central player indifferent
between vaccinating and forgoing, the peripheral players must raise their probabilities of
vaccination to offset the central player’s high infection risk; and the central player reduces
her probability of vaccination to best respond. Thus, the central player has a higher network
centrality but a lower equilibrium vaccination probability than the peripheral players.

Figure 3.1: The central and peripheral players’ probabilities of vaccination in a 3-person
homogeneous star network with β = .05, t = .8, D = 1. The horizontal axis is the vaccination
cost, with a domain c ∈ (.05, .1119]. The vertical axis is the probability of vaccination, with
ranges θ1 ∈ [0, 1) and θ2 ∈ [.1714, 1).
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Moreover, such relationship persists as the number of players increases because the central
player always faces a greater infection risk than the peripherals. Thus, the peripheral players
must still choose a greater probability of vaccination than the central player to make her
indifferent. The next proposition generalizes the result to an n-person star network.
Proposition 3.4. In an n-person homogeneous star network, for c/D ∈ (β, c̄], there exists
a mixed-strategy NE in which the central player chooses a lower probability of vaccination
than all peripheral players, that is
θ1∗ < θi∗ ,
where i = 2, ..., n and c̄ solves θ1∗ (c/D) = 0.
Proof. In appendix.
Figure 3.2 illustrates Proposition 3.4’s result by simulating the 3-person to 20-person
star networks using parameters β = .05, t = .8, D = 1, c = .1. The dashed magenta curve
shows the central player’s probability of vaccination, and the solid blue curve shows the
peripherals’. Both curves increase as the number of players increases, which means that for
either a central or peripheral player, the probability of vaccination increases as the player’s
centrality increases.14 Such a positive correlation is consistent with the intuition that as an
individual becomes more socially active, she is more likely to get vaccinated. Propositions
3.3 and 3.4 consider a different question. That is, if players interact in a given star network
but cannot coordinate, the high-centrality player strategically chooses a lower probability of
vaccination than the low-centrality player.
Furthermore, the gap between the two curves expands as the number of players increases,
which shows the difference between the central and peripheral players’ probabilities of
vaccination. To understand the expansion, consider adding one peripheral player to the
existing star network. Since the added player only directly interacts with the central player,
the central player’s infection risk is increasing faster than an existing peripheral player’s.
Thus, under the equilibrium’s indifference property, the peripheral players must raise their
14

Most centrality measures assign a higher score for both central and peripheral players as the number
of players increases. Except for the degree centrality, which considers the number of connections, so the
peripheral player’s degree centrality is always 1.
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Figure 3.2: The central and peripheral players’ probabilities of vaccination in a
homogeneous star network with β = .05, t = .8, D = 1, c = .1. The horizontal axis is
the number of players, which ranges from 3 to 20. The vertical axis is the probability of
vaccination.
probabilities of vaccination faster to compensate the central player’s extra increment of
infection risk.

3.6

Policy analysis: a universal vaccination mandate

The above sections show that in a 3-person star network, the central player is the least
likely to vaccinate in a mixed-strategy NE, though she should be the first to vaccinate. This
section shows that a targeted policy can achieve the optimal allocation, while a universal
mandate produces the same welfare as in a mixed-strategy NE.
Neilson and Xiao (2018) suggest that targeted subsidies and fines can improve the welfare
of a suboptimal pure-strategy NE. The subsidies and fines ensure that the targeted player
has a dominant strategy to vaccinate, and the others’ best response is to forgo the vaccine.
Thus, players achieve the unique optimal allocation under the targeted policy. Moreover, the
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targeted policy eliminates the possibility of a mixed-strategy NE. Therefore, the targeted
policy can achieve the social optimum, whether players coordinate or not.
The authors also show that a universal mandate cannot improve any pure-strategy NEs
in any network. A universal mandate requires all players to take the vaccine; but in a purestrategy NE, some players forgo the vaccine if their expected illness cost is smaller than
the vaccination cost. Thus, a pure-strategy NE produces a greater welfare than a universal
mandate.15 However, the next two propositions show that in both a 2-person network and
a 3-person star network, a universal mandate performs the same as the mixed-strategy NE.
Proposition 3.5. In a 2-person homogeneous network, if c/D ∈


β, p1∅ , a universal

mandate produces the same expected social welfare a mixed-strategy NE does.
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 3.6. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, if c/D ∈ (β, c̄), a universal
mandate produces the same expected social welfare as in a mixed-strategy NE.
Proof. In appendix.
The indifference property drives the welfare equivalence in the propositions above. Since
players are indifferent to whether to take or forgo the vaccine, a probability mixture of these
two strategies generates the same payoff.16 Moreover, such an indifference property always
exists in a mixed-strategy NE. Thus, the next proposition generalizes the welfare equivalence
to any n-person network.
Proposition 3.7. For any n-person network, if a mixed-strategy NE exists, a universal
mandate produces the same expected social welfare a mixed-strategy NE does.
Proof. In appendix.
15

Again, the social welfare is the same if the vaccination cost is lower than the exogenous susceptibility.
Notice the two important assumptions for the equivalence result: (1) individuals cannot coordinate and
(2) individuals are risk-neutral. In the equilibrium, loss-averse players choose a lower probability to vaccinate
than risk-neutral players. Given the same expected loss, loss-averse individuals prefer facing the uncertain
infection risk than taking the vaccine. Thus, to make them indifferent, the equilibrium must reduce the
probability of vaccination as well as the chance of gaining the free-riding benefit.
16
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Though a universal mandate cannot achieve the social optimum, dealing with a mixedstrategy NE is useful. A targeted policy may not be feasible or politically palatable, while a
universal mandate can be because everyone makes the same choice. Moreover, policymakers
usually prefer paying a fixed vaccination cost to prevent a possible epidemic.17 Above all, a
universal mandate is a practical policy option if targeting is infeasible and coordination is
difficult.

3.7

Conclusion

This paper builds on Neilson and Xiao (2018)’s stylized network model and establishes the
vaccination game’s mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in a 2-person complete network and a
3-person star network. The mixed equilibrium allocation leads to new results. The most
surprising one is that in a star network, the central player has a greater centrality but chooses
a lower probability of vaccination than the peripheral players. Such result is consistent with
empirical evidence about flu vaccination coverage of workers in occupations with frequent
public contact and individuals’ condom use behavior in a causal relationship.
This finding is based on an understanding of the anti-coordinative nature of the
vaccination game. If the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium assigns the vaccine to some agents
but not to everyone, then multiple equilibria arise. Each agent prefers the other agents to
take the vaccine; thus, they cannot agree on which equilibrium to achieve. Instead, everyone
chooses a probability mixture to achieve a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The model also provides policy implications, especially for the universal mandate.
Though a universal mandate cannot improve a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, it generates
the same social welfare as in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The welfare equivalence
holds in any network where a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Thus, a universal
mandate is a practical option for policymakers if targeting is infeasible and coordination is
difficult. Empirical research finds that government mandates increase individuals’ incentive
17

In the equilibrium, a loss-averse player’s expected loss is greater than the vaccination cost. In that
case, the universal mandate can reduce the aggregate expected loss and prevent the relatively more probable
under-vaccination outcome, while leaving the aggregate utility unchanged.
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to vaccinate and that the effects spill over to other types of vaccines (Lawler, 2017, Carpenter
and Lawler, 2017).
Future research can exploit various occupations’ social activeness as a measure to
proximate individuals centrality and investigate workers flu vaccination decisions to test
which equilibrium allocation is realized. Also, the relationship between players’ centrality
and vaccination probability in a complex network worths exploring. That is, whether a
high-centrality agent always choose a lower vaccination probability in an arbitrary network.
Lastly, researchers can investigate the evolutionary game theory’s interpretation. In a 2person game, two types of players are involved (e.g., one being aggressive and the other
being conservative). Both approaches can help in understanding the heterogeneity of different
groups’ behavior.
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Chapter 4
Influenza Vaccination and Occupation
Centrality: Evidence from U.S.
Workers
4.1

Introduction

Vaccination yields benefits for the vaccinated individuals but also others who interact with
them in the contagion network. For example, people obtain seasonal influenza vaccines
so they are less likely to contract flu than if they were unvaccinated. Moreover, those who
interact with the vaccinated individual are also less likely to be sick than before. The Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that in the 2017-2018 season, 37.1%
of adults and 57.9% of children received influenza vaccination, which prevented 7.1 million
illnesses, 109,000 hospitalizations, and 8,000 deaths in the United States (CDC, 2018a,b,
Rolfes et al., 2019).1
Because not everyone is vaccinated, policymakers may be disproportionately interested
about the flu vaccination coverage of socially active people who are at more central positions
in the contagion network. We refer to them as high-centrality individuals.2 Their vaccination
1

Adults are people aged 18 or older, children are people aged 6 month through 17 years during the
2017-2018 flu season.
2
The definition of centrality here is closest to degree centrality in network theory, which refers to the
number of links each node has. See examples of centrality definitions in Jackson (2008).
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generates a large social benefit, which is the sum of the private benefit to the vaccinated
people and the external benefit to others who interact with them. The private benefit
depends on the avoided sickness cost and the probability that an individual becomes sick.
The external benefit depends on the extent that an individual can spread the disease, which
is positively correlated with the individual’s social activeness. Therefore, vaccinating socially
active people with a higher centrality can generate large social benefits relative to less socially
active people. However, whether high-centrality individuals are more likely to get vaccinated
than low-centrality individuals is an open empirical question.
This paper investigates the empirical evidence about the correlation between individuals’
social centrality and probability of flu vaccine uptake. The ex-ante theoretical predictions for
the correlation is mixed. A typical epidemiology model considers a complete random network
and predicts that a high-centrality individual is more likely to obtain the vaccine than
a low-centrality individual (Hethcote, 2000). Recent economic theories consider strategic
vaccination choices in various network models but draw contradictory predictions about
high-centrality individuals’ vaccination decision. First, Goyal and Vigier (2015) develop a
bipartite network model and find that agents who gain a higher return from interaction
have a higher centrality and invest more in protection, compared to low-return individuals.
Secondly, Neilson and Xiao (2018) find that in an incomplete network, if players do not
have dominant strategies but can coordinate, high-centrality player can get vaccinated in
one equilibrium but forgo vaccination in the other. In addition, Xiao (2018) find that in an
uncoordinated equilibrium, the high-centrality player is less likely to get vaccinated than the
low-centrality player within an incomplete network. Therefore, the conflicting theoretical
predictions call for empirical evidence.
This is the first paper to investigate whether individuals with a greater centrality are more
likely to get vaccinated than less socially active individuals. Though it is unclear whether
high-centrality individuals received sufficient vaccination, economics scholars measured the
marginal size of externality when policies motivate potential high-centrality people to get
vaccinated. White (2018) found that when California mandates health care personnel to
receive the flu vaccine, a 10.3 percent increase in their vaccination coverage reduces influenza
diagnosis in inpatient hospitalizations by 20.1 percent and emergent outpatient visits by 8.1
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percent. Similarly, Ward (2014) found that when Ontario expands flu vaccine subsidies,
which originally targeted seniors aged 65+, a 10.8 percentage point increase in younger
adults’ vaccination coverage reduces at least 20 percent of seniors’ influenza and pneumonia
admissions during the epidemic period. Therefore, vaccinating health care personnel in
California and younger adults in Ontario generates considerable external benefit, but those
people on the margin would not obtain flu vaccines if they were not mandated or must pay
out of pocket.
Social centrality can vary on multiple dimensions. Thus, identifying individuals who are
at the center of their respective networks is very difficult. However, workplace-specific social
activeness is an important measure because workplaces are a common space where many
people interact and spread the flu. Economics literature provides evidence that workers are
the important source of disease spread, whereas policies restricting interpersonal interactions
in workplaces are an effective disease control method.3 Moreover, policymakers implement
targeted vaccination policies based on occupation, age, and health status.

The U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Homeland Security provide
pandemic influenza guidance that prioritizes vaccine to selected occupational groups who
provide critical services and groups with fragile health status when the flu is widely spread
and vaccine supplies are limited. Similarly, the U.S. Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices recommends an annual flu shot for all people who are 6 months or older but
also emphasizes the importance on vaccinating higher-risk people and people who have
direct contact with them, such as doctors, nurses, and caregivers (Grohskopf et al., 2018).
Therefore, we focus on workers and exploit every occupation’s characteristics to identify
their centrality.
We implement the investigation on whether workers with higher centrality are more likely
to get vaccinated in three steps. First, we apply principal component analysis to construct
the centrality score for every occupation with selected descriptors from the Occupational
3

Markowitz et al. (2010) find that employment and flu-related doctor visits are strongly positively
correlated, especially for those occupations with frequent public contact. Pichler and Ziebarth (2017) find
that the flu-related admissions in states without sick leave insurance mandate are greater than the states
with the mandate, which suggests that workers are more likely to be present at work if they do not have sick
pay. Adda (2016) finds that policies restricting interpersonal interactions in workplaces effectively control
disease spread, such as schools and public transportation networks.
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Information Network (O*NET). Secondly, we utilize the centrality score to augment the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) with restricted information on industry
and occupation. Finally, we run regressions to estimate the correlation between worker’s
centrality and flu vaccine uptake, while controlling for other relevant variables.
We find that high-centrality workers are more likely to get vaccinated than low-centrality
workers, but the positive correlation between centrality and vaccine uptake becomes
statistically insignificant if we control for health care personnel. Furthermore, workers who
face direct exposure to diseases are more likely to get vaccinated than those who do not, no
matter they are health care personnel or not. Lastly, vaccine uptake is not monotonically
increasing in centrality across all specifications, which is consistent with the incomplete
network model’s predictions. The result suggests that while all workers consider the risk of
direct exposure to diseases, only health care personnel pay attention to the infection risk
in social interactions. Thus, there is room for targeted vaccination policies that generate
potentially large social benefits.
This paper contributes to the economics literature about externality and vaccination.
We provide the first empirical evidence for the various theoretical predictions (Galeotti and
Rogers, 2013, Goyal and Vigier, 2015, Neilson and Xiao, 2018, Xiao, 2018). The general result
is consistent with the complete and bipartite network models, and more specific findings can
be explained by incomplete network models.
This paper also contributes to the public health literature about flu vaccination.
Existing literature shows that many occupations with frequent public contact have lower
flu vaccination coverage than the population average (Luckhaupt et al., 2014, O’Halloran
et al., 2017). And this paper is the first to investigate the correlation between individuals’
social centrality and vaccine uptake. Our result is consistent with the literature that highcentrality non-health care workers are under-vaccinated.
Lastly, this paper constructs a novel centrality measure to quantify the social-activeness
for every occupation. Mathematicians and network scientists utilize centrality to describe
the importance of different nodes in visual or simulated networks (see an example in Dekker
(2013)), and this is the first attempt to measure the social-activeness for the interpersonal
contact of all workers.
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4.2

Data

Our primary data are the individual-level cross-sectional data from the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) for the year 2013. BRFSS uses telephone survey
to collect information about U.S. residents on their health-related risk behaviors, chronic
health conditions, and preventive services utilizations. BRFSS started to support an optional
industry/occupation module in 2013, and 21 states included the module.4 BRFSS interviews
more than 400,000 adults every year, and we restrict the sample to 75,712 employed nonmilitary adults. We can observe their flu vaccine uptake, demographics, health conditions,
insurance coverage, and the restricted industry/occupation information. Table 4.1 presents
the summary statistics.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Variables in Main Regressions
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Flu vaccine uptake
Health care personnel
Female
Age group
Race/ethnicity group
Education level
Income level
Married
High-risk conditions
Have personal health care provider
Have medical insurance

0.39
0.16
0.54
3.85
1.37
3.13
4.12
0.60
0.23
0.80
0.87

0.49
0.37
0.50
1.35
0.83
0.91
1.26
0.49
0.42
0.40
0.33

0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
6
4
4
5
1
1
1
1

Centrality
Exposure

0.88
0

3.09
1

-7.71
-0.96

8.32
2.87

522.86
75,712

977.30

1.27

30576.48

Sampling weight
Observations

Source: BRFSS 2013 and O*NET. Age group includes 18-24, 25-34, 3544, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+. Race/ethnicity group includes white, black,
Hispanic, and other. Education level includes less than high school, high
school graduate or GED, some college or technical school, and college
graduate. Income level includes less than 15K, 15-25K, 25-35K, 35-50K,
and 50K+.
4
The 21 states are California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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We observe the key outcome variable, whether the respondent receives a flu vaccine in
the past 12 months. An individual can get vaccinated by either a flu shot with a needle or
a spray in the nose. We can also observe the time of vaccine uptake, which ranges from Jan
2012 to Feb 2014. Though the vaccination timing spans across three flu seasons, we do not
distinguish which flu season the respondent gets vaccinated for three reasons. First, there
are no significant events related to flu or flu vaccine during that period, such as a pandemic
or vaccine shortages. Secondly, the flu prevalence and vaccine effectiveness are similar
across these flu seasons. The flu severity is either low (2011-2012) or moderate (2012-2013,
2013-2014) among adults and overall population (Biggerstaff et al., 2017) , and the vaccine
effectivenesses are around 50% (CDC, 2018c). Lastly, researchers compare the calendar-year
estimates versus season-specific estimates from 2010-2013 and find no significant differences
in the overall estimates for adults’ flu vaccination coverage (Lu et al., 2013).
The most important variable is the workers’ occupation, and our sample contains 492
unique occupations. We classify these occupations into 22 major groups, 93 minor groups,
and 412 broad occupations based on the 2000 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC)
codes.5 Our sample covers all non-military major and minor groups and over 90% of nonmilitary broad occupations.6 The SOC codes allow us to supplement the BRFSS data with
a centrality score for each occupation.
We use the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) data to construct the occupation
centrality. O*NET surveys workers and provides data about specific job descriptions and
requirements, which include numeric measures about work contexts and activities, i.e.,
descriptors. First, we select 6 descriptors about work context and 16 descriptors about work
activities that are related to interpersonal interactions. Table 4.2 presents the summary
statistics of the 22 descriptors for 492 occupations. Then we standardize the descriptors
as mean zero and standard deviation one and apply the principal component analysis to
construct the centrality score. We choose the first principal component as the centrality
score, which represents the greatest variance of all descriptors among all components. The
5

BRFSS originally coded the industry/occupation module in the Census code, and O’Halloran et al.
(2017) convert the Census codes to equivalent 2000 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes and
2002 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry codes.
6
The 2000 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) specifies 22 major groups, 93 minor groups, 446
broad occupations, and 801 detailed occupations of non-military occupations.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of 22 Occupational Descriptors
Descriptors
Work Context
Physical Proximity
Contact With Others
Coordinate or Lead Others
Deal With External Customers
Face-to-Face Discussions
Work With Work Group or Team
Work Activities
Assisting and Caring for Others
Coaching and Developing Others
Communicating with Persons Outside Organization
Communicating with Supervisors, Peers, or Subordinates
Coordinating the Work and Activities of Others
Developing and Building Teams
Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships
Guiding, Directing, and Motivating Subordinates
Interpreting the Meaning of Information for Others
Performing Administrative Activities
Performing for or Working Directly with the Public
Provide Consultation and Advice to Others
Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with Others
Selling or Influencing Others
Staffing Organizational Units
Training and Teaching Others
Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Weight (%)

60.71
83.57
61.81
60.00
88.25
78.10

15.46
10.71
13.24
21.57
8.45
11.24

17
50
15
5
39
25

100
100
91
99
100
100

1.27
3.90
4.81
3.82
3.55
4.15

45.57
48.03
54.63
73.10
51.01
48.88
65.55
44.94
53.90
43.54
48.49
44.39
49.76
37.26
26.99
54.12
492

18.56
13.04
18.84
10.21
13.38
13.74
12.45
15.06
14.79
15.36
23.19
13.93
15.10
16.92
13.79
12.62

10
7
8
34
9
10
21
6
19
6
3
10
5
5
3
8

97
87
94
95
89
89
97
90
93
89
94
96
93
99
73
91

3.20
5.54
4.82
4.91
5.56
5.85
5.30
5.56
4.67
4.72
3.44
5.26
5.61
4.00
5.44
5.53

Source: O*NET. The “importance” score reported for descriptors under Work Activities. Each descriptor’s
impact on centrality reported in percentage as “Weight” and summed up to 100. All descriptors
standardized before applying the principal component analysis.
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centrality ranges from −7.71 to 8.32, which is a cardinal measure of the representative
worker’s social activeness. Finally, we merge the centrality dataset with the BRFSS data.7
Another important variable is the workers’ industry. It is necessary to distinguish whether
people work in a healthcare-related industry or not because these workplaces are likely to
require employees to obtain a flu vaccine. We follow O’Halloran et al. (2017) and define health
care personnel as people working in a clinical setting based on the 2002 North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry code, who are clinical and nonclinical staff
working in hospitals (NAICS 622), outpatient care and physician offices (NAICS 6214 and
6211), long-term care facilities (NAICS 6216, 6231, 6232, 6233, and 6239), and other clinical
settings (NAICS 6212, 62131, 62132, 6213, 6215, and 6219). Figure 4.1 is the histogram
of the number of workers by major occupation groups, which are ranked from the highest
average centrality. Each group is decomposed to health care personnel and non-health care
personnel. Health care personnel exists in all major groups except the “farming, fishing and
forestry” group.
Lastly, we select three descriptors from O*NET as additional controls. “Exposed to
disease or infections (exposure)” from the work context category controls for workers’ direct
exposure to disease. “Concern for others (concern)” from the work style category describes
workers’ altruistic motivation. “Social” from the work style category represents workers’
social skills required for the job. All three variables are standardized.
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 plot the flu vaccination coverage by the centrality of the 22 major
occupation groups and of the 492 specific occupations. The blue dots represent occupations
that contain a majority of health care personnel. Both figures include two upward sloping
fitted lines, with the solid one using the full sample while the dashed one excludes the blue
dots. The upward sloping lines show that workers’ social centrality and flu vaccine coverage
are positively correlated. In both figures, the dashed lines are flatter than the corresponding
7

O*NET uses the 2010 SOC codes, so we follow the crosswalk guide provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2012) to convert the codes to 2000 SOC. If multiple 2010 SOC codes are matched with a single
2000 SOC codes, we take the simple average of the descriptors. When merging with BRFSS, we find 335
matches of detailed occupations. For the remaining more general occupations, we take the simple average of
the descriptors of all detailed occupations under the corresponding category to impute descriptors for 157
general occupations. See detailed explanations about the construction of centrality in the Appendix.
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Figure 4.1: The Number of Workers of 22 Major Occupation Groups: Listed from the
Group with Highest Centrality
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Figure 4.2: The Flu Vaccine Coverage by Centrality of 22 Major Occupation Groups
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Figure 4.3: The Flu Vaccine Coverage by Centrality of 492 Occupations: Dots in Lighter
Blue Contain More Health Care Personnel than Dots in Darker Blue
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solid lines, which shows that non-health care personnel’s vaccine uptake is less sensitive to
centrality than health care personnel.

4.3

Methods

We first estimate a linear probability model. Specifically, we run the following regression:
1.vaxi = β0 + β1 centralityi + β2 exposurei + β3 1.hcpi + γXi + statei + i

(4.1)

where 1.vaxi is the vaccine uptake indicator, centralityi is the occupation’s centrality,
exposurei is the occupation’s standardized disease exposure, 1.hcpi is the health care
personnel indicator, Xi is a vector of the demographics and health-related characteristics,
statei is the state fixed effects, and i is the error term. We report estimates with BRFSS
sampling weights and state-level cluster-robust standard errors.
We also estimate a linear probability model with centrality bins to allow flexible
coefficients and to facilitate direct comparison across bins. The occupation centrality is a
linear measure, but its relationship with an individual’s flu vaccine uptake is not necessarily
linear. Thus, we use discrete changes on the integer-level to categorize centrality into
seventeen bins in (−8, 9). Figure 4.4 is the histogram of the number of workers by centrality
bin, which shows that the health care personnel’s centrality varies from −5 to 6. We specify
bin [0, 1) as the base level which contains both weighted mean and median. Specifically, we
run the regression with centrality bins:
1.vaxi = β0 + β1(bin) 1.centralityi(bin) + β2 1.hcpi + β3 Xi + statei + i

(4.2)

where 1.vaxi is the vaccine uptake indicator, 1.centralityi(bin) is the centrality bin indicator
for every bin but the base level, exposurei is the occupation’s standardized disease exposure,
1.hcpi is the health care personnel indicator, Xi is a vector of the demographics and healthrelated characteristics, statei is the state fixed effects, and i is the error term. We report
estimates with BRFSS sampling weights and state-level cluster-robust standard errors.
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Figure 4.4: The Number of Workers by Centrality Bin: Health Care Personnel (HCP) vs.
Non-HCP
The key assumption is that an individual’s flu vaccine uptake does not affect her
occupation choice. The challenge to the assumption is that there may be unobservables that
simultaneously influence vaccine uptake and career choice. For example, certain occupations
require workers to get vaccinated, such as doctors and nurses, and people who hold strong
beliefs against vaccines may self-select to avoid these occupations. Moreover, if these antivaccine people randomly self-select to non-health care occupations, their average centrality
is likely to be lower than the health care workers’, which biases the estimated impact of
occupation centrality on vaccine uptake upward.

That is if vaccination and centrality

are positively correlated, and “positive self-selection” exists, we overestimate a positive
coefficient and underestimate a negative coefficient in terms of the magnitude.
We control individuals’ heterogeneous vaccination cost and potential illness cost by Xi .
Xi includes demographics, such as gender, age, race, education, income, and marital status,
and health-related characteristics, such as high-risk condition, insurance status, access to
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health care provider. Income and health-related information describe a person’s vaccination
cost and potential illness cost if she contracts flu.

4.4

Results

Table 4.3 reports the main results of the effect of centrality on flu vaccine uptake. Columns
(1)-(4) use the full sample. Column (5) includes health care personnel only. Column (6)
excludes health care personnel. Table 4.4 presents estimates of the same regression models
except specifying centrality as bins. Columns (1)-(3) use the full sample. Column (4) includes
health care personnel only. Column (5) excludes health care personnel. All columns include
seventeen bins for centrality while omitting the base level bin [0, 1). Each coefficient of
centrality bin is the point estimate of the difference in the probability of flu vaccine uptake
between workers in that bin and workers at the base level. And the constant in column (1),
28.4%, represents the base-level workers’ average flu vaccination coverage. Figures C.2 to
C.6 plot these coefficients of centrality bin.
First, centrality and flu vaccine uptake are positively correlated across all specifications
in Table 4.3, which is consistent with the predictions of models assuming a complete network.
However, if we control for whether the worker is a health care personnel (columns (3)-(6)), the
coefficient is no longer statistically significant. Also, the coefficient of health care personnel
in column (3) suggests that they are 18.39% more likely to get vaccinated than others, which
is statistically significant at 1% level. Such finding suggests that health care personnel
contributes significantly to the positive correlation. Plots of the coefficient estimates in
Table 4.4 (Figures (C.2)-(C.6)) confirms the finding.
Secondly, Table 4.3 column (4) shows that the coefficient of the interaction term
between centrality and health care personnel is positive and significant both statistically
and economically, which means that health care personnel are more sensitive to centrality
than non-health care personnel at the same centrality level. The reason could be that health
care personnel have a good knowledge about the infection risk in social interactions and thus
pay more attention to the risk.
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Table 4.3: The Linear Model Estimates of the Effect of Centrality on Flu Vaccine Uptake
Dependent: Flu Vaccine Uptake
(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Full Sample

(3)
Full Sample

(4)
Full Sample

0.0189∗∗∗
(0.0010)

0.0024∗∗
(0.0011)
0.0575∗∗∗
(0.0036)

0.0015
(0.0011)
0.0207∗∗∗
(0.0033)
0.1839∗∗∗
(0.0089)

Constant

0.3182∗∗∗
(0.0157)

0.0459∗∗
(0.0215)

Controls
State Fixed Effects

No
No

Observations

75712

Centrality
Exposure

(5)
HCP

(6)
Non-HCP

0.0040
(0.0038)
0.0252∗∗∗
(0.0065)

0.0009
(0.0011)
0.0161∗∗∗
(0.0041)

0.0425∗
(0.0222)

0.0008
(0.0011)
0.0193∗∗∗
(0.0034)
0.1743∗∗∗
(0.0125)
0.0054∗
(0.0031)
0.0417∗
(0.0219)

0.0564
(0.0785)

0.0463∗∗
(0.0222)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

75712

75712

75712

11997

63715

Health Care Personnel
Centrality X HCP

Source: BRFSS 2013 and O*NET. Controls include gender, age group, race/ethnicity group, income level,
marital status, and indicators for high-risk conditions, having personal health care provider, and having
medical insurance. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ means that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level. All models weighted with BRFSS weights. Standard errors clustered at the state-level and
reported in parentheses. Mean calculated as the weighted mean of flu vaccine uptake. Percentage change
calculated as the fraction of the coefficient of centrality over mean and multiplied by 100.
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Table 4.4: The Bin Model Estimates of the Effect of Centrality on Flu Vaccine Uptake
Dependent: Flu Vaccine Uptake
(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Full Sample

(3)
Full Sample

-0.1564∗∗∗
(0.0326)
-0.0135
(0.0287)
-0.1087∗∗∗
(0.0335)
-0.0724∗∗∗
(0.0241)
0.0172
(0.0259)
-0.0419∗∗
(0.0166)
0.0076
(0.0176)
0.0593∗∗∗
(0.0202)
0.0486∗∗
(0.0222)
0.1220∗∗∗
(0.0330)
0.1021∗∗∗
(0.0124)
0.0684∗∗∗
(0.0170)
0.2231∗∗∗
(0.0188)
0.1381∗∗∗
(0.0249)
0.0207
(0.0909)
0.1295∗∗
(0.0504)

-0.1333∗∗∗
(0.0240)
0.0316
(0.0373)
-0.0892∗∗
(0.0323)
-0.0057
(0.0239)
0.0143
(0.0275)
-0.0020
(0.0189)
0.0125
(0.0196)
0.0532∗∗
(0.0192)
0.0114
(0.0197)
0.0409
(0.0283)
0.0290∗∗
(0.0122)
-0.0071
(0.0159)
0.0584∗∗∗
(0.0184)
0.0321
(0.0238)
-0.0429
(0.0771)
0.0848∗
(0.0446)

Constant

0.2840∗∗∗
(0.0213)

Controls
State Fixed Effects
Observations

Centrality
[−8, −7)
[−7, −6)
[−6, −5)
[−5, −4)
[−4, −3)
[−3, −2)
[−2, −1)
[−1, 0)
[1, 2)
[2, 3)
[3, 4)
[4, 5)
[5, 6)
[6, 7)
[7, 8)
[8, 9)

(4)
HCP

(5)
Non-HCP

0.0889
(0.1405)
0.0370
(0.0765)
-0.0260
(0.0506)
-0.0582∗
(0.0286)
0.0286
(0.0704)
0.0911∗∗∗
(0.0290)
-0.0537
(0.0455)
0.0184
(0.0296)
0.0204
(0.0450)
-0.0290
(0.0663)
0.0529
(0.0349)
-0.0225
(0.0621)
0.1350
(0.1589)
0.6663∗∗∗
(0.0567)

-0.1222∗∗∗
(0.0234)
0.0322
(0.0344)
-0.0673∗∗
(0.0289)
-0.0100
(0.0304)
0.0420
(0.0331)
0.0127
(0.0235)
0.0218
(0.0253)
0.0535∗∗
(0.0197)
0.0237
(0.0286)
0.0654∗
(0.0319)
0.0280∗
(0.0156)
0.0141
(0.0211)
0.0290
(0.0337)
0.0256
(0.0329)
0.0027
(0.0801)
0.0953∗∗
(0.0420)

0.0335
(0.0290)

-0.1276∗∗∗
(0.0252)
0.0354
(0.0350)
-0.0668∗∗
(0.0278)
-0.0074
(0.0263)
0.0373
(0.0279)
0.0052
(0.0203)
0.0215
(0.0206)
0.0567∗∗∗
(0.0189)
0.0108
(0.0201)
0.0627∗∗
(0.0283)
0.0290∗∗
(0.0127)
0.0117
(0.0170)
0.0509∗∗
(0.0209)
0.0150
(0.0261)
-0.0026
(0.0747)
0.0961∗∗
(0.0442)
0.1865∗∗∗
(0.0100)
0.0248
(0.0303)

0.0777
(0.0852)

0.0258
(0.0341)

No
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

75712

75712

75712

11997

63715

Health Care Personnel

Source: BRFSS 2013 and O*NET. Controls include gender, age group, race/ethnicity group,
income level, marital status, and indicators for high-risk conditions, having personal health care
provider, and having medical insurance. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ means that the coefficient is statistically
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All models weighted with BRFSS weights.
Standard errors clustered at the state-level and reported in parentheses.

66

Thirdly, Table 4.4 shows that coefficients of centrality bins are not monotonically increasing in centrality, which is not consistent with the complete network models’ predications.
The non-monotonicity allows room for incomplete network models’ explanations that some
workers may behave strategically on vaccination decisions.
Lastly, Table 4.4 shows that variations are mostly driven by the end bins. The coefficient
of bin [-8,-7) is at least 12% smaller than the base level, while the coefficient of bin [8,9) is
at least 8% greater than the base level; both estimates are statistically significant. On the
contrary, the middle bins’ magnitudes of coefficients are relatively small. For example, in
column (3), the differences in the coefficients of bins from -5 to 5 are within 10%, and these
bins constitute 86.7% of all workers and 91.5% of non-health care workers.

4.5

Robustness checks

We choose two different subsets of the 22 descriptors mentioned in Table 4.1 to construct
alternative centrality measures to check the robustness. We construct the “context” measure
with 6 descriptors about work context and the “activity” measure with 16 descriptors about
work activities. Table 4.5 replicates Table 4.3 by substituting centrality with the “context”
measure. Table 4.6 does the same exercise with the “activity” measure. We find that the
coefficient estimates are generally consistent with our finding with the original centrality
measure. Column (1) shows that all three centrality measures are positively correlated with
vaccine uptake in the baseline estimation. Columns (2-4) show that the coefficient of
centrality moves closer to zero if we add more controls, while the coefficients of exposure and
health care personnel indicator are always statistically significant at 1% level.

4.6

Conclusion

Our major finding is that workers’ social centrality and flu vaccine uptake are positively
correlated, which confirms the hypothesis that high-centrality individuals are more likely to
get vaccinated than low-centrality individuals. The finding is consistent with the complete
network models’ predictions (Hethcote, 2000, Goyal and Vigier, 2015). Moreover, we find
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Table 4.5: The Linear Model Estimates of the Effect of Centrality (Context) on Flu Vaccine
Uptake
Dependent: Flu Vaccine Uptake
(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Full Sample

(3)
Full Sample

(4)
Full Sample

0.0312∗∗∗
(0.0031)

-0.0021
(0.0036)
0.0599∗∗∗
(0.0043)

-0.0023
(0.0038)
0.0225∗∗∗
(0.0039)
0.1846∗∗∗
(0.0088)

Constant

0.3176∗∗∗
(0.0157)

0.0402∗
(0.0216)

Controls
State Fixed Effects

No
No

Observations

75712

Centrality (Context)
Exposure

(5)
HCP

(6)
Non-HCP

-0.0013
(0.0122)
0.0292∗∗∗
(0.0078)

-0.0032
(0.0038)
0.0177∗∗∗
(0.0046)

0.0383
(0.0222)

-0.0035
(0.0038)
0.0199∗∗∗
(0.0040)
0.1686∗∗∗
(0.0150)
0.0147
(0.0087)
0.0375
(0.0221)

0.0428
(0.0788)

0.0429∗
(0.0224)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

75712

75712

75712

11997

63715

Health Care Personnel
Centrality X HCP

Source: BRFSS 2013 and O*NET. Controls include gender, age group, race/ethnicity group, income level,
marital status, and indicators for high-risk conditions, having personal health care provider, and having
medical insurance. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ means that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level. All models weighted with BRFSS weights. Standard errors clustered at the state-level and
reported in parentheses. Mean calculated as the weighted mean of flu vaccine uptake. Percentage change
calculated as the fraction of the coefficient of centrality over mean and multiplied by 100.
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Table 4.6: The Linear Model Estimates of the Effect of Centrality (Activity) on Flu Vaccine
Uptake
Dependent: Flu Vaccine Uptake
(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Full Sample

(3)
Full Sample

(4)
Full Sample

0.0195∗∗∗
(0.0008)

0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0010)
0.0576∗∗∗
(0.0035)

0.0020∗∗
(0.0010)
0.0207∗∗∗
(0.0033)
0.1835∗∗∗
(0.0089)

Constant

0.3208∗∗∗
(0.0157)

0.0469∗∗
(0.0212)

Controls
State Fixed Effects

No
No

Observations

75712

Centrality (Activity)
Exposure

(5)
HCP

(6)
Non-HCP

0.0044
(0.0037)
0.0256∗∗∗
(0.0063)

0.0015
(0.0009)
0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0041)

0.0433∗
(0.0219)

0.0014
(0.0010)
0.0197∗∗∗
(0.0033)
0.1765∗∗∗
(0.0118)
0.0048
(0.0031)
0.0426∗
(0.0216)

0.0567
(0.0773)

0.0473∗∗
(0.0219)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

75712

75712

75712

11997

63715

Health Care Personnel
Centrality X HCP

Source: BRFSS 2013 and O*NET. Controls include gender, age group, race/ethnicity group, income level,
marital status, and indicators for high-risk conditions, having personal health care provider, and having
medical insurance. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ means that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level. All models weighted with BRFSS weights. Standard errors clustered at the state-level and
reported in parentheses. Mean calculated as the weighted mean of flu vaccine uptake. Percentage change
calculated as the fraction of the coefficient of centrality over mean and multiplied by 100.
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that flu vaccine uptake is not monotonically increasing in centrality, which allows room for
incomplete network models’ explanations (Neilson and Xiao, 2018, Xiao, 2018).
We also find that health care personnel contributes significantly to the the positive
correlation because the coefficient of centrality moves closer to zero if we control for whether
the worker is a health care personnel. Such result suggests that high-centrality non-health
care workers are under-vaccinated, which indicates potential targeting options for future
vaccination policies and campaigns.
Finally, we call for a more sophisticated method to develop the centrality scores. Though
we apply an effective method to construct the centrality measure, the primary objective of
O*NET is not for the study of contagious diseases. Thus, authorities and researchers should
work together to collect data related to disease exposure and social activeness. Moreover, a
comprehensive survey should also consider the behavioral response to flu contraction. For
example, whether the workplace will be closed once there is an epidemic, such as schools;
and whether the worker will be stay at home once she catches the flu.
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A
A.1

Chapter 2 Appendix
Proofs

Lemma .1. Assume that βt < 2/3. In a 3-person homogeneous complete network, the
socially-optimal set of vaccinated individuals is given by

S ∗∗ =




{1, 2, 3}






{j, k}



{j}





∅

h

i

if

c
D

∈

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D


i
∈ pi{j,k} , 2pi{j} − pi{j,k}
i

i
i
i
i
∈ 2p{j} − p{j,k} , 3p∅ − 2p{j}


∈ 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} , ∞

0, pi{j,k}

(2.2)

Proof. Without loss of generality, we can normalize D = 1. It is straightforward to show that
Π{1,2,3} ≥ Π{j,k} if and only if c ≥ pi{j,k} , that Π{j,k} ≥ Π{j} if and only if c ≥ 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} ,
and that Π{j} ≥ Π∅ if and only if c ≥ 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} .
It remains to show that pi{j,k} < 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} < 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} . The first inequality holds


i
i
i
i
i
i
because p{j,k} < p{j} implies p{j,k} < p{j,k} + 2 p{j} − p{j,k} = 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} . For the second
inequality, compute

3pi∅ − 2pi{j} − 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} = 3pi∅ − 4pi{j} + pi{j,k}

= 3 2(1 − β)2 β(t + t2 − t3 ) + (1 − β)β 2 (2t − t2 ) − 4(1 − β)βt
= β(1 − β)t(6t − 9tβ − 6t2 + 6t2 β + 2)


= β(1 − β)t 6(t − t2 )(1 − β) + (2 − 3βt) .
The last line is positive because t > 0, 0 < β < 1, and βt < 2/3.
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Lemma .2. In a 3-person homogeneous complete network, the pure-strategy equilibrium set
of vaccinated individuals is given by

S∗ =




{1, 2, 3}






{j, k}



{j}





∅

h

i

if

c
D

∈

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

i

∈ pi{j,k} , pi{j}

i
i
i
∈ p{j} , p∅

∈ pi∅ , ∞

0, pi{j,k}

(2.3)

Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of the Nash equilibrium: i ∈ S ∗ when
c ≤ piS ∗ −i D and i ∈
/ S ∗ when c > piS ∗ D.
Proposition .3. Assume that βt < 2/3. In a 3-person homogeneous complete network,
too few individuals get vaccinated in a pure-strategy equilibrium when the vaccination cost
i
i 

c
i
i
i
i
i
i
−
2p
,
3p
∪
p
−
p
∈
p
,
2p
{j} . Otherwise, the correct number of individuals
∅
∅
{j,k}
{j}
{j}
D
get vaccinated.
Proof. First show that pi{j} < 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} and pi∅ < 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} . To establish the first


inequality, note that 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} = pi{j} + pi{j} − pi{j,k} > pi{j} . And for the second


inequality, note that 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} = pi∅ + 2 pi∅ − pi{j} > pi∅ .
Then we show that different relationships between the two bounds in the middle can lead
i

to consistent results. If 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} ≤ pi∅ , then for the first interval, pi{j} , 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} ⊂
i
i 
i


i
i
i
i
i
∗
i
i
i
p{j} , p∅ with S = {j} on this interval, and p{j} , 2p{j} − p{j,k} ⊂ p{j,k} , 2p{j} − p{j,k}
with S ∗∗ = {j, k} on this interval. And the second interval follows from direct comparison
of expressions (2.2) and (2.3). If 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} > pi∅ , then the union of the two intervals is

i

i
pi{j} , 3pi∅ − 2pi{j} . Break it down into three regions. For Dc ∈ pi{j} , pi∅ , we know S ∗∗ =
i

{j, k}, but S ∗ = {j}. For Dc ∈ pi∅ , 2pi{j} − pi{j,k} , again S ∗∗ = {j, k}, but S ∗ = ∅. For

i
c
i
i
i
i
∈ 2p{j} − p{j,k} , 3p∅ − 2p{j} , we know S ∗∗ = {j}, but S ∗ = ∅. And βt < 2/3 guarantees
D
the existence of of the last interval, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1.
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Lemma .4. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, the socially optimal set of vaccinated
individuals is given by

S ∗∗





{1, 2, 3}



= {1}





∅

if

c
D

∈ [0, β]

if

c
D

if

c
D


∈ β, p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β)

∈ p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β), ∞

(2.5)

Proof. Begin by showing that if Π{i,j} < Π{1} then Π{i,j} > Π{1,2,3} . The former occurs if
2c + βD < c + 2βD which holds if and only if c < βD. But then 3c < 2c + βD, and
therefore vaccinating two people cannot be optimal. Next, note that Π{i} = c + 2pi{j} D >
c+2βD > Π{1} since pi{j} > β, so it is never socially optimal for player i 6= 1 to get vaccinated
when player 1 does not. That leaves the potential socially-optimal vaccination sets to be
S ∗∗ = {1, 2, 3}, S ∗∗ = {1}, and S ∗∗ = ∅. The remainder of the proof follows from expression
(4).
Lemma .5. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, the pure-strategy equilibrium set of
vaccinated individuals is given by



{1, 2, 3}








{1} or {2, 3}



S ∗ = {1} or {2} or {3}






{1}






∅

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

if

c
D

∈ [0, β]
i

i
∈ β, p{j}

i
∈ pi{j} , pi∅

∈ pi∅ , p1∅

∈ p1∅ , ∞

(2.6)

Proof. Without loss of generality, we can normalize D = 1. As in Lemma 2.2, when c ≤ β
everyone has a dominant strategy of vaccinating, and when c > p1∅ everyone has a dominant
strategy of not vaccinating.
When β < c ≤ p1∅ there exists an equilibrium in which only player 1 gets vaccinated.
To see this, note that if 2 and 3 remain unvaccinated, if 1 also remains unvaccinated his
probability of infection is p1∅ ≥ c, and so his best response is to vaccinate. When 1 vaccinates
2 and 3 each face the infection probability of pi{1} = β < c, and so they remain unvaccinated.
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When β < c ≤ pi{j} there exists an equilibrium in which players 2 and 3 get vaccinated.
When 1 does not get vaccinated but player j does, player i’s probability of infection is pij ≥ c
and so player i’s best response is to vaccinate. When both 2 and 3 vaccinate player 1’s
probability of infection is β < c and so player 1’s best response is to not vaccinate.
When pi{j} < c ≤ pi∅ there exist equilibria in which one of the peripheral players gets
vaccinated and player 1 does not. The proof treats player 2 as the vaccinated player. If
1 and 3 remain unvaccinated, 2’s infection probability is pi∅ ≥ c and so 2’s best response
is to vaccinate. If 2 gets vaccinated and 1 does not, 3’s infection probability is pi{j} <
c and therefore player 3 remains unvaccinated. Finally, if 2 gets vaccinated and 3 does
not, 1’s probability of infection is p1{j} = pi{j} < c and so 1’s best response is to remain
unvaccinated.
Proposition .6. In a 3-person homogeneous star network,
(a) there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which too few individuals get vaccinated

when Dc ∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) ;
(b) there exist pure-strategy equilibria in which the right number but the wrong set of
i

individuals get vaccinated when Dc ∈ pi{j} , pi∅ ; and
(c) there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which too many people get vaccinated when
i

c
i
∈ β, p{j} .
D
Proof. The result follows from comparing expressions (2.5) and (3.2).
Proposition .7. In a 3-person homogeneous star network,
(a) S ∗ = {1} is trembling-hand perfect when

c
D


∈ β, p1∅ ;

(b) S ∗ = {2} or {3} is trembling-hand perfect when
(c) S ∗ = {2, 3} is trembling-hand perfect when

c
D

c
D



∈ pi{j} , pi∅ ; and



∈ β, pi{j} .

Proof. Consider an equilibrium allocation S ∗ and let γ, δ, and  denote the trembling
probabilities for players 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Normalize D = 1.
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(a) Suppose that c/D ∈ (β, p1∅ ) and consider the equilibrium S ∗ = {1}. Player 1’s
expected loss from remaining unvaccinated is
1
πN
= (1 − δ)(1 − )p1∅ + δ(1 − )p1{2} + (1 − δ)p1{3} + δβ

1
and limδ,→0 πN
= p1∅ > c. Player 2’s expected loss from remaining unvaccinated is

2
πN
= (1 − γ)(1 − )β + γ(1 − )p2∅ + (1 − γ)β + γp2{3} ,

2
and limγ,→0 πN
= β < c. Player 3’s expected loss from remaining unvaccinated is

3
πN
= (1 − γ)(1 − δ)β + γ(1 − δ)p3∅ + (1 − γ)δβ + γδp3{2} ,

3
and limγ,δ→0 πN
= β < c. Thus there exists a scalar η > 0 such that for all 0 < γ, δ,  < η we
1
3
2
> c, and so player 1 vaccinates while 2 and 3 remain unvaccinated.
< c and πN
, πN
have πN

This establishes that S ∗ = {1} is trembling-hand perfect.
(b) Suppose that c/D ∈ (pi{j} , pi∅ ) and consider the equilibrium S ∗ = {2}. Player 1’s
payoff from remaining unvaccinated is
1
πN
= (1 − δ)(1 − )p1{2} + δ(1 − )p1∅ + (1 − δ)β + δp1{3} ,

1
and limδ,→0 πN
= p1{2} < c. Player 2’s expected loss from remaining unvaccinated is

2
πN
= (1 − γ)(1 − )p2∅ + γ(1 − )β + (1 − γ)p2{3} + γβ,

2
and limγ,→0 πN
= p2∅ > c. Player 3’s expected loss from remaining unvaccinated is

3
πN
= (1 − γ)(1 − δ)p3{2} + γ(1 − δ)β + (1 − γ)δp3∅ + γδβ,

3
and limγ,δ→0 πN
= p3{2} < c. Thus there exists a scalar η > 0 such that for all 0 < γ, δ,  < η
1
3
3
we have πN
, πN
< c and πN
< c, and so players 1 and 3 remain unvaccinated while 2 takes
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the vaccine. This establishes that S ∗ = {2} is trembling-hand perfect, and the proof that
S ∗ = {3} is trembling-hand perfect is similar.
(c) Suppose that c/D ∈ (β, pi{j} ) and consider the equilibrium S ∗ = {2, 3}. For player 1
the expected loss from remaining unvaccinated is
1
= (1 − δ)(1 − )β + δ(1 − )p1{3} + (1 − δ)p1{2} + δp1∅ ,
πN

1
and limδ,→0 πN
= β < c. For player 2 the expected loss from remaining unvaccinated is

2
= (1 − γ)(1 − )p2{3} + γ(1 − )β + (1 − γ)p2∅ + γp2{1} ,
πN

3
2
= p3{2} > c. Thus there exists
= p2{3} > c. By the same analysis limγ,δ→0 πN
and limγ,→0 πN
1
3
2
< c, and so
> c and πN
, πN
a scalar η > 0 such that for all 0 < γ, δ,  < η we have πN

players 2 and 3 vaccinate while 1 remains unvaccinated. This establishes that S ∗ = {2, 3} is
trembling-hand perfect.
Proposition .8. In a 3-person complete network with D1 > D2 = D3 , there exists a purestrategy equilibrium in which the right number but the wrong set of individuals get vaccinated
i
i 

when c ∈ βD1 , p2{3} D2 ∪ p2{3} D1 , p2∅ D2 , given the existence of such intervals.
Proof. First show that for c ∈



i
βD1 , p2{3} D2 , S ∗ = {2, 3} but S ∗∗ = {1, 2} or {1, 3}.

The vaccination set {2, 3} is a Nash equilibrium because player 2 and 3 will not forgo
vaccination for c ≤ p2{3} D2 = p3{2} D3 , and player 1 will not vaccinate for c > βD1 . However,
Π{2,3} = 2c + βD1 > 2c + βD2 = Π{1,3} = Π{1,2} , and we can find that {1, 3} and {1, 2} are
socially optimal by comparing with other vaccination sets.

i
Next show that for c ∈ p2{3} D1 , p2∅ D2 , S ∗ = {2} or {3}, but S ∗∗ = {1}. Consider
the vaccination set {2}. It is an equilibrium because player 2 will not forgo vaccination for
c ≤ p2∅ D2 , and player 1 will not vaccinate for c > p1{2} D1 . Also, p3{2} = p1{2} and D3 < D1 , and
so player 3 also forgoes vaccination. However, Π{2} = c+p3{2} D3 +p1{2} D1 = c+p3{1} (D3 +D1 ) >
c + 2p3{1} D3 = Π{1} , and we can find that {1} is socially optimal by comparing with other
vaccination sets. The proof for S ∗ = {3} is similar.
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Proposition .9. In a 3-person complete network with c1 < c2 = c3 , there exists a purestrategy equilibrium in which the right number but the wrong set of individuals get vaccinated
i
i


when cD1 , cD2 ∈ β, p2{3} or cD1 , cD2 ∈ p2{3} , p2∅ , given the existence of such intervals.
Proof. Note that D1 = D2 = D3 indicates c/D1 < c/D2 = c/D3 . Thus, the proof is
identical to Proposition 2.8 because the ratio of c/D determines the intervals of pure-strategy
equilibria and social optima.
Proposition .10. In a 3-person complete network with t1 > t2 = t3 , there exists a Nash
i

equilibrium in which the wrong person gets vaccinated when Dc ∈ p1{2} , p2∅ , given the
existence of such an interval.
Proof. Assume t1 > t2 = t3 = t. First compute p1{2} = p1{3} = β +(1−β)βt1 > β +(1−β)βt =
p2{1} = p2{3} . Given these probabilities, when only one individual gets vaccinated, social
cost is minimized when that vaccine goes to agent 1. When no one takes the vaccine,
p1∅ = β + 2(1 − β)2 β(t1 + t1 t − t21 t) + (1 − β)β 2 (2t1 − t21 ), while p2∅ = p3∅ = β + 2(1 − β)2 β(t +
t1 t−t2 t1 )+(1−β)β 2 (t+t1 −t1 t). It is straightforward to show that when t1 > t, p1∅ > p2∅ = p3∅ .

i
1
2
Now assume that the interval p{2} , p∅ is nonempty. That there exist values of t, t1 ,
and β for which this is true can be shown by example: when t = 0.3, t1 = 0.4, and b = 0.6,
i

c
2
1
2
1
one can compute p{2} = 0.696 and p∅ = 0.757. When D ∈ p{2} , p∅ , the vaccination set
S ∗ = {2} is a Nash equilibrium. The fact that c < p2∅ D means that 2’s best response to
nobody else vaccinating is to take the vaccine, and the fact that c > p1{2} > p3{2} means that
neither 1 nor 3 choose to vaccinate when 2 takes the vaccine. As already argued, this is
inefficient because expected social cost is lower when 1 takes the vaccine instead.

Proposition .11. In a 3-person complete network with β1 > β2 = β3 , there exists
a pure-strategy equilibrium in which too many individuals get vaccinated when c/D ∈

n
o
i
max β1 , 2p2{1} − β2 , p3{2} , and the right number but the wrong set of individuals get

i
vaccinated when c/D ∈ p1{2} , p2∅ , given the existence of such intervals.
Proof. Assume that β1 > β2 = β3 = β.

To begin, compute p1{2} = β1 + (1 − β1 ) βt,

p3{2} = p2{3} = β + (1 − β)β1 t, and p2{∅} = β + (1 − β) [(1 − β)β1 + (1 − β1 ) β] (t + t2 − t3 ) +
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(1 − β) ββ1 (2t − t2 ). Note that p3{2} < p1{2} because β1 + (1 − β1 ) βt − (β + (1 − β)β1 t) =
(β1 − β) (1 − t) > 0. To establish that the two intervals in question can be nonempty
for some parameters, set β = 0.1, β1 = 0.21, and t = 0.6. The resulting in
n
o
i

i
2
3
1
2
tervals are max β1 , 2p{1} − β , p{2} = (max {0.21, 0.208} , 0.2134] and p{2} , p{∅} =
(0.2574, 0.29533]. For the remainder of the proof normalize D = 1.
i
o

n
3
2
Now assume that the interval max β1 , 2p{1} − β , p{2} is nonempty. We demonstrate
that there exists a Nash equilibrium in which S ∗ = {2, 3}. Player 1 chooses not to vaccinate
because c > β1 = p1{2,3} , and players 2 and 3 choose to vaccinate because c ≤ p3{2} = p2{3} .
Compute the social losses Π{1} = c + 2p2{1} , Π{2,3} = 2c + β1 , and Π{1,3} = 2c + β. It is enough


to show that Π{1} < Π{1,3} , but this holds because 2c + β > c + 2p2{1} − β + β = c + 2p2{1} .

i
1
2
Next assume that the interval p{2} , p{∅} is nonempty. We first show that S ∗ = {2}
is a Nash equilibrium.

Player 2 vaccinates because c ≤ p2{∅} , but players 1 and 3 do not

vaccinate because p3{2} < p1{2} < c. Thus, {2} constitutes a Nash equilibrium vaccination
allocation. However, Π{1} = c + 2p3{2} < c + p3{2} + p1{2} = Π{2} , and so the Nash equilibrium
is not socially optimal.

Proposition .12. In a 3-person star network with D1 = 0 < D, c1 = c − βD for c > βD,
there exist unique inefficient equilibrium outcomes
(a) that too many individuals get vaccinated when

c
D


i
∈ β, p2{3} ; and


i
(b) that the right number but the wrong set of individuals get vaccinated when Dc ∈ p2{3} , p2∅ .

i
Proof. For the over-vaccination outcome (a), show that for c/D ∈ β, p2{3} , S ∗ = {2, 3} but
Π{2,3} > Π{1} . First note that forgoing the vaccination is a strictly dominant strategy for
player 1 because the cost c1 > 0 but the benefit is zero. Next, {2, 3} is a Nash vaccination
set because agents 2 and 3 will not forgo vaccination for c ≤ p2{3} = p3{2} . Moreover, since
c < p2{3} < p2∅ and c < p3{2} < p3∅ , there is no equilibrium in which none of the players
vaccinates. Thus, S ∗ = {2, 3} is the unique Nash equilibrium. Lastly, {2, 3} is not socially
optimal because Π{2,3} = 2c = 2(c1 + βD) > c1 + 2βD = Π{1} .
For the wrong-vaccination outcome (b), show that for c/D ∈



i
p2{3} , p2∅ , S ∗ = {2} or

{3} but Π{2} = Π{3} > Π{1} . Without loss of generality, consider the vaccination set S =
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{2}. Player 2 does not deviate, given the equilibrium choices of the other two, because
c ≤ p2∅ . Agents 3’s best response is to remain unvaccinated because c > p2{3} = p3{2} , and 1
remains unvaccinated because forgoing vaccination is a dominant strategy. Thus, S ∗ = {2}
and S ∗ = {3} are Nash equilibrium vaccination sets. Agent 1’s dominant strategy leaves
{2, 3} as the only other possible Nash equilibrium vaccination set, but 3’s best reponse to
2’s vaccination is to forgo a vaccination, as already discussed. Therefore {2} and {3} are
the only Nash equilibrium vaccination sets. Neither of them are socially optimal because
Π{2} = c + p2{3} D = c1 + βD + [β + (1 − β)βt]D = c1 + 2βD + (1 − β)βtD > c1 + 2βD = Π{1} .

Proposition .13. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, a subsidy s to the central player
that incurs an administrative cost g constitutes a potential social improvement if


(a) s ≥ c − p1∅ D and g ≤ p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) D − c when
(b) s ≥ c − pi{j} D and g ≤ 2(pi{j} − β)D when
(c) s ≥ c − βD and g ≤ c − βD when

c
D

c
D

c
D


∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) ;

i

∈ pi{j} , pi∅ ;

i

∈ β, pi{j} .

Proof. For each case we must show that s ≥ c − p1S̄ D and g ≤ ΠS̄ − Π{1} , where S̄ is the
vaccination set in the worst equilibrium. Without loss of generality, normalize D = 1.

When c ∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) , the undesirable allocation is S̄ = ∅. The subsidy s ≥
c − p1∅ = c − p1S̄ , which satisfies the first condition. Also, the administrative cost g ≤
p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) − c = (p1∅ + 2pi∅ ) − (c + 2β) = Π∅ − Π{1} = ΠS̄ − Π{1} , which satisfies the second
condition.
When c ∈



i
pi{j} , pi∅ , the undesirable allocation is either S̄ = {2} or S̄ = {3}. The

subsidy s ≥ c − pi{j} = c − p1S̄ , which satisfies the first condition. Also, the administrative
cost g ≤ 2(pi{j} − β) = (c + 2pi{j} ) − (c + 2β) = Π{2} − Π{1} = ΠS̄ − Π{1} , which satisfies the
second condition.

i
When c ∈ β, pi{j} , the undesirable allocation is S̄ = {2, 3}. The subsidy s ≥ c −
β = c − p1{2,3} = c − p1S̄ , which satisfies the first condition. Also, the administrative cost
g ≤ c − β = (2c + β) − (c + 2β) = Π{2,3} − Π{1} = ΠS̄ − Π{1} , which satisfies the second
condition.
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Proposition .14. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, a fine f to the central player
that incurs an administrative cost g constitutes a potential social improvement if


(a) f ≥ c − p1∅ D and g ≤ p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) D − c when
(b) f ≥ c − pi{j} D and g ≤ 2(pi{j} − β)D when
(c) f ≥ c − βD and g ≤ c − βD when

c
D

c
D

c
D


∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β) ;


i
∈ pi{j} , pi∅ ;

i

∈ β, pi{j} .

Proof. For each case we must show that f ≥ c − p1S̄ D and g ≤ ΠS̄ − Π{1} . The proof follows
the same process as in the proof above for Proposition 2.13 by substituting s with f .
Proposition .15. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, assuming the administrative
cost g is sufficiently small, the following policies constitute potential social improvements:
(a) an untargeted vaccination subsidy or nonvaccination fine when
(b) an untargeted vaccination tax or nonvaccination reward when

c
D
c
D


∈ p1∅ , p1∅ + 2 pi∅ − β ;

∈ β, pi∅ .

Proof. First normalize D = 1. A vaccination set S ∗ is a Nash equilibrium with an untargeted
vaccination subsidy of s if for all i ∈ S ∗ we have c − s ≤ piS ∗ −i , and for all i ∈
/ S ∗ we have
c − s > piS ∗ . A vaccination set S ∗ is a Nash equilbrium with an untargeted nonvaccination
/ S ∗ we have c > piS ∗ + f .
fine of f if for all i ∈ S ∗ we have c ≤ piS ∗ −i + f , and for all i ∈
Consequently, if the untargeted subsidy s makes S ∗ an equilibrium, so does the untargeted
nonvaccination fine of the same size, f = s.
Suppose that c ∈ (p1∅ , p1∅ + 2(pi∅ − β)]. By Proposition 2.6 this is a situation in which


there are too few vaccinations; that is, S ∗∗ = {1} but S ∗ = ∅. Setting s ∈ c − p1∅ , c − pi∅
means that s > 0 and the policy is a subsidy. The unique Nash equilibrium with the subsidy
generates expected social cost, gross of the administrative cost, of Π{1} = c + 2β and the
unique Nash equilibrium without the subsidy generates expected social cost of Π∅ = p1∅ +2pi∅ .

Compute Π∅ − Π{1} = p1∅ + 2pi∅ − c − 2β > p1∅ + 2pi∅ − p1∅ − 2β = 2 pi∅ − β > 0. If
g < Π∅ − Π{1} the subsidy constitutes a potential social improvement. By the same analysis,


a fine f ∈ c − p1∅ , c − pi∅ also constitutes a potential social improvement.
Next suppose that c ∈ (pi{j} , pi∅ ]. By Proposition 2.6 this is a situation in which there
is the right number but wrong set of vaccinations; that is, S ∗∗ = {1} but S ∗ = {2} or
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{3}. Setting s ∈ c − p1∅ , c − pi∅ means that s < 0 so the policy is a tax. The unique Nash
equilibrium with the subsidy generates expected social cost, gross of the administrative cost,
of of Π{1} = c + 2β and the worst Nash equilibrium without the subsidy generates expected
social cost of Π{2} = c + 2pi{j} . Compute Π{2} − Π{1} = c + 2pi{j} − c − 2β = 2(pi{j} − β) > 0.
If g < Π{2} − Π{1} the subsidy constitutes a potential social improvement. By the same


analysis, a fine f ∈ c − p1∅ , c − pi∅ also constitutes a potential social improvement, and this
fine is negative, and should thus be interpreted as a nonvaccination reward.
Finally, suppose that c ∈ (β, pi{j} ]. By Proposition 2.6 this is a situation in which there are


too many vaccinations; that is, S ∗∗ = {1} but S ∗ = {2, 3}. Setting s ∈ c − p1∅ , c − pi∅ means
that s < 0 because pi{j} < pi∅ , so the policy is a tax. The unique Nash equilibrium with the
subsidy generates expected social cost, gross of the administrative cost, of of Π{1} = c + 2β
and the worst Nash equilibrium without the subsidy generates expected social cost of Π{2} =
2c + β. Compute Π{2,3} − Π{1} = 2c + β − c − 2β = c − β > 0. If g < Π{2,3} − Π{1} the subsidy


constitutes a potential social improvement. By the same analysis, a fine f ∈ c − p1∅ , c − pi∅
also constitutes a potential social improvement, and this fine is negative, and should thus be
interpreted as a nonvaccination reward.

Proposition .16. For any n-person network and any Nash equilibrium allocation S ∗ with
#S ∗ < n, the expected social cost is lower in the equilibrium than with a universal mandate;
that is, ΠS ∗ < ΠN .
Proof. Let S ∗ denote the equilibrium vaccination set. For every agent i ∈
/ S ∗ it must be the
case that ci > piS ∗ Di , and therefore total social cost satisfies
Π

S∗

=

X
i∈S ∗

ci +

X
i∈S
/ ∗

piS ∗ Di

<

X
i∈S ∗
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ci +

X
i∈S
/ ∗

ci =

n
X
i=1

ci = ΠN .

B

Chapter 3 Appendix

B.1

Asymmetric mixed-strategy solutions in a 3-person star
network

There exist two asymmetric mixed-strategy solutions where some agent plays a pure strategy
i

i
2
while others play mixed strategies. Equation (3.2) shows that if c/D ∈ p{j} , p∅ , the purestrategy NE assigns the vaccine to one agent. If some agent commits to a pure strategy
of non-vaccination, the other two agents will disagree on who should get vaccinated in the
pure-strategy NE. Thus, each of the uncommitted agents choose a probability mixture to
achieve a mixed-strategy NE. The next proposition considers the circumstance where the
central agent does not get vaccinated.
Proposition .17. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, for c/D ∈



pi{j} , c̄

i
, there exists

a mixed-strategy NE in which the central player chooses not to get vaccinated or θ1∗ = 0,
while both peripheral players choose the probability of vaccination
θ2∗ = θ3∗ = 1 −

c/D − β − (1 − β)βt
,
(1 − β)2 βt2

where c̄ = β + (1 − β)t − 21 (1 − β)3 t2 − 12 (1 − β)2 t

p
(1 − β)2 t2 + 4 − 4t.

Proof. Without loss of generality, we can normalize D = 1. By symmetry, θ2∗ = θ3∗ , and they
solve the following equation (I drop the star hereafter for simplicity):
θ2 · p2{3} + (1 − θ2 ) · p2∅ = c.
Evaluate the central player’s expected illness cost with θ2∗ = 1 −

(3)
c−β−(1−β)βt
,
(1−β)2 βt2

(θ2 )2 · p1{2,3} + 2θ2 (1 − θ2 ) · p1{2} + (1 − θ2 )2 · p1∅ ≤ c.

and get
(4)

Thus, the central player does not get vaccinated because her expected illness cost is no
greater than the vaccination cost.
Figure B.1 shows the result in Proposition .17.
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Next consider the circumstance where one of the peripheral agents does not get
vaccinated.

i
i
2
Proposition .18. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, for c/D ∈ p{j} , p∅ , there
exists a mixed-strategy NE in which the peripheral player i chooses not to get vaccinated or
θi∗ = 0, while the central player chooses the probability of vaccination
θ1∗ = 1 −

c/D − β
,
(1 − β)[βt + (1 − β)βt2 ]

and the peripheral player j chooses the probability of vaccination
θj∗ = 1 −

c/D − β − (1 − β)βt
,
(1 − β)βt(1 − βt)

where c̄ = β + (1 − β)t − 21 (1 − β)3 t2 − 12 (1 − β)2 t

p
(1 − β)2 t2 + 4 − 4t.

Proof. Without loss of generality, we can normalize D = 1. Let player 3 be the unvaccinated
player. Then θ1∗ solves the equation
θ1 · p2{1} + (1 − θ1 ) · p2∅ = c,

(5)

θ2 · p1{2} + (1 − θ2 ) · p1∅ = c.

(6)

and θ2∗ solves the equation

Evaluate the player 3’s expected illness cost with θ1∗ = 1 −
c−β−(1−β)βt
,
(1−β)βt(1−βt)

c−β
(1−β)[βt+(1−β)βt2 ]

and θ2∗ = 1 −

and get
θ1 · p2{1} + (1 − θ1 )θ2 · p2{3} + (1 − θ1 )(1 − θ2 ) · p2∅ ≤ c.

(7)

Thus, player 3 does not get vaccinated because his expected illness cost is no greater than
the vaccination cost.
Figure B.2 shows the result in Proposition .18.
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Figure B.1: Probabilities of vaccination in a 3-person homogeneous star network with
β = .05, t = .8, D = 1. The central player commits to non-vaccination while peripheral
players choose the same probability mixture. The horizontal axis is the vaccination cost,
with a domain c ∈ (.088, .1119]. The vertical axis is the probability of vaccination, with
ranges θ1 = 0 and θ2 ∈ [.1714, 1).

92

Figure B.2: Probabilities of vaccination in a 3-person homogeneous star network with β =
.05, t = .8, D = 1. Peripheral player 3 commits to non-vaccination while the central player
and peripheral player 2 choose probability mixtures. The horizontal axis is the vaccination
cost, with a domain c ∈ (.088, .1169]. The vertical axis is the probability of vaccination, with
ranges θ1 ∈ [0, .4318), θ2 ∈ [.2083, 1), and θ3 = 0.
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B.2

The n-person star network

This section provides the formula to calculate the probability of vaccination in an n-person
star network, and demonstrates the existence of multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In
an n-person star network, there are agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} in which player 1 is the central
agent, and player i = 2, ..., n is the peripheral agent. Lemma .19 provides the probability
of infection for all agents if S = ∅ in an n-person star network. For S 6= ∅, if 1 ∈ S, then
/ S, then the network is equivalent to an (n − #S) person star
p1{1} = 0 and pi{1} = β; if 1 ∈
network, and the following formula can still apply.
Lemma .19. In an n-person homogeneous star network (n ≥ 3), if 1 ∈
/ S, and #S denotes
the number of vaccinated players, the central player’s probability of infection is
n−1−#S

p1S

X n − 1 − #S 
= β + (1 − β)
β b (1 − β)n−1−#S−b (1 − (1 − t)b ),
b
b=1

(8)

and p1{1} = 0; and if 1 ∈
/ S and i ∈
/ S, the peripheral player’s probability of infection is
(

n−2−#S

)
X n − 2 − #S 
piS = β + (1 − β)t β + (1 − β)
β b (1 − β)n−2−#S−b (1 − (1 − t)b ) .
b
b=1
(9)
and pi{1} = β and pi{i} = 0. Note that b represents the number of peripheral players who
contract the disease exogenously.
Proof. p1{1} = 0, pi{1} = β, and pi{i} = 0 are obvious. Consider S = ∅, then #S = 0.
p1∅






n−1
n−1 2
n−2
= β + (1 − β)
β(1 − β) t +
β (1 − β)n−3 (1 − (1 − t)2 )
1
2



n − 1 n−1
n−1
+··· +
β (1 − (1 − t) )
n−1

n−1 
X
n−1 b
= β + (1 − β)
β (1 − β)n−1−b (1 − (1 − t)b ),
b
b=1
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where the bth term in the bracket represents the probability of interpersonal transmission
from peripheral players to player 1, when b peripheral players are infected exogenously.
pi∅






n−2
n−2 2
n−3
= β + (1 − β)t β + (1 − β)
β(1 − β) t +
β (1 − β)n−4 (1 − (1 − t)2 )
1
2



n − 2 n−2
n−2
+··· +
β (1 − (1 − t) )
n−2
(
)

n−2 
X
n−2 b
n−2−b
b
= β + (1 − β)t β + (1 − β)
β (1 − β)
(1 − (1 − t) ) .
b
b=1

where the bth term in the bracket represents the probability of interpersonal transmission
from peripheral players to player 1 (excluding the transmission from player i to 1), when b
peripheral players are infected exogenously.
Since vaccinating #S peripheral players is equivalent to reducing the network size by
#S, substituting n by n − #S obtains the result.
Notice that p1∅ > pi∅ . Lemma .20 finds all pure-strategy NEs for various c/D.
Lemma .20. In an n-person homogeneous star network, the pure-strategy equilibrium set of
vaccinated agnets is given by



N
if c/D ∈ [0, β]





i


i

{1}
or
N
\{1}
if
c/D
∈
β,
p

N \{1,i}



i



i
i


{1} or N \{1, i} if c/D ∈ pN \{1,i} , pN \{1,i,j}



..
S∗ =
.




i


i
i

{1} or {j}
if c/D ∈ p{j} , p∅








{1}
if c/D ∈ pi∅ , p1∅







∅
if c/D ∈ p1∅ , ∞

Proof. Prove by the definition of the pure-strategy NE.
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(10)

For c/D ∈


β, pi∅ , multiple pure-strategy NEs exist.

Thus, there exists a mixed-

strategy NE where all agents choose a probability mixture. Proposition 3.4 discusses such
an equilibrium.

96

B.3

Proofs


Proposition .21. In a 2-person homogeneous network, if c/D ∈ β, pi∅ , in a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium both players choose the probability of vaccination
θ∗ = 1 −

c/D − β
.
(1 − β)βt

Proof. By symmetry, let θ1∗ = θ2∗ = θ∗ . If i forgoes the vaccine, then against j’s strategy
profile (θ, 1 − θ), i’s expected illness cost is (I drop the star hereafter for simplicity)
θβD + (1 − θ)[β + (1 − β)βt]D.
Evaluate the above formula with θ = 1 −

c/D−β
,
(1−β)βt

and get

θβD + (1 − θ)[β + (1 − β)βt]D = c,
which satisfies the equilibrium requirement that i is indifferent about vaccinating and not.
Proposition .22. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, for c/D ∈ (β, c̄], there exists a
mixed-strategy NE in which the central player chooses the probability of vaccination
θ1∗ = 1 −

c/D − β
p
,
(1 − β)(1 − (1 − c/D)(1 − β))t

and both peripheral players choose the probability of vaccination
θ2∗ = θ3∗ = 1 −

1−β−

p
(1 − c/D)(1 − β)
,
(1 − β)βt

p
where c̄ = β +(1−β)t− 12 (1−β)3 t2 − 12 (1−β)2 t (1 − β)2 t2 + 4 − 4t that solves θ1∗ (c/D) = 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can normalize D = 1. If player 1 forgoes the vaccine,
her probability of infection depends on the strategy profiles (θ2 , 1 − θ2 ) and (θ3 , 1 − θ3 ). By
symmetry, θ2∗ = θ3∗ . Thus, 1’s expected illness cost is
(θ2 )2 · p1{2,3} + 2θ2 (1 − θ2 ) · p1{i} + (1 − θ2 )2 · p1∅ .
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√
Evaluate the above formula with θ2 = 1 −

1−β−

(1−c)(1−β)
,
(1−β)βt

and get

(θ2 )2 · p1{2,3} + 2θ2 (1 − θ2 ) · p1{i} + (1 − θ2 )2 · p1∅ = c,
which satisfies the equilibrium requirement that 1 is indifferent about vaccinating and not.
Next, consider player 3. If 3 forgoes the vaccine, then against the strategy profile (θ1 , 1 −
θ1 ) and (θ2 , 1 − θ2 ), 3’s expected illness cost is
θ1 · p3{1} + (1 − θ1 )θ2 · pi{j} + (1 − θ1 )(1 − θ2 ) · p3∅ .
√
Evaluate the above formula with θ1 = 1 −

c−β
√
, θ2
(1−β)(1− (1−c)(1−β))t

= 1−

1−β−

(1−c)(1−β)
,
(1−β)βt

and

get
θ1 · p3{1} + (1 − θ1 )θ2 · pi{j} + (1 − θ1 )(1 − θ2 ) · p3∅ = c.
Lastly, find the interval of c in which the mixed-equilibrium strategy vector (θ1∗ , θ2∗ , θ3∗ ) is
valid. For β < c < p1∅ , 0 < θ2∗ = θ3∗ < 1. And for c > β, θ1∗ < 1. However, at c = p1∅ , θ1∗ < 0.
p
Evaluate θ1∗ with c̄ = β + (1 − β)t − 21 (1 − β)3 t2 − 12 (1 − β)2 t (1 − β)2 t2 + 4 − 4t and get
θ1∗ = 0. Since c̄ < pi∅ < p1∅ for t ∈ (0, 1), the interval of c in which a mixed-strategy NE exists
is (β, c̄].

Proposition .23. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, as in the mixed-strategy NE
described in Proposition 3.2, the central player chooses a lower probability of vaccination
than the peripheral players, that is
θ1∗ < θ2∗ = θ3∗ .
Proof. Since both equations (3.3) and (3.4) equal to c, their left hand sides must be equal.
Rewrite the equation as
θ2 θ2 · p1{2,3} +θ2 (1 − θ2 ) · p1{2} + θ2 (1 − θ2 ) · p1{2} +(1 − θ2 )(1 − θ2 ) · p1∅
=θ1 θ2 · p2{1}

+θ1 (1 − θ2 ) · p2{1} + θ2 (1 − θ1 ) · p2{3} +(1 − θ1 )(1 − θ2 ) · p2∅
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(11)

Assume θ1 = θ2 , then the left hand side must be greater than the right hand side because
p1{2,3} = p2{1} , p1{2} > p2{1} , p1{2} = p2{3} , and p1∅ > p2∅ . Since the left hand side is the central
player’s expected infection risk, it must be decreasing in θ2 . To balance the equation, we
must raise θ2 . Thus, θ1∗ < θ2∗ .
Proposition .24. In an n-person homogeneous star network, for c/D ∈ (β, c̄], there exists
a mixed-strategy NE in which the central player chooses a lower probability of vaccination
than all peripheral players, that is
θ1∗ < θi∗ ,
where i = 2, ..., n and c̄ solves θ1∗ (c/D) = 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let i = 2 and j ∈ J = {3, ..., n}. Consider the vaccinated
peripheral agents in J. Define M as the set of vaccinated agents in J, so M = S ∩ J.
Define m as the number of vaccinated agents in J, so #M ≡ m = 0, ..., n − 2. Define
Mm as the collection of all M which contains m vaccinated peripheral agents. For example,
M1 = {{3}, {4}, ...{n}}, and Mn−2 = {J}.
Next, calculate the probability of infection based on whether player 1 and player 2 get
vaccinated:
(i) If 1 ∈ S, 2 ∈ S, p1S = p2S = 0;
(ii) If 1 ∈ S, 2 ∈
/ S, p1S = 0, p2S = p2{1}∪M = β;
(iii) If 1 ∈
/ S, 2 ∈ S, p1S = p1{2}∪M , p2S = 0;
(iv) If 1 ∈
/ S, 2 ∈
/ S, p1S = p1M , p1S = p1M .
Consider case (iii), the size of M determines player 1’s probability of infection. Thus, let
p1{2}∪M = p12m for all M ∈ Mm . Also, in case (ii), let p2{1}∪M = p21m for all M ∈ Mm . Notice
that p12m ≥ p21m = β for every m.
Consider case (iv), the size of M determines both players’ probabilities of infection. Thus,
let p1M = p1m and p2M = p2m for all M ∈ Mm . Notice that p1m ≥ p2m for every m.
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Now consider the mixed-strategy NE. By symmetry, θ2∗ = θj∗ for all j. And θ1∗ and θ2∗
solve the following equations:


n−2 
n−2 
X
X
n−2 m
n−2 m
n−2−m 1
θ2
θ2 (1 − θ2 )
p2m D + (1 − θ2 )
θ2 (1 − θ2 )n−2−m p1m D = c (12)
m
m
m=0
m=0


n−2 
n−2 
X
X
n−2 m
n−2 m
n−2−m 2
θ1
θ2 (1 − θ2 )
p1m D + (1 − θ1 )
θ2 (1 − θ2 )n−2−m p2m D = c (13)
m
m
m=0
m=0
Since both equations equal to c, the left hand sides must also be equal. Divide both equations
by D, we have


n−2 
n−2 
X
X
n−2 m
n−2 m
n−2−m 1
θ2
θ2 (1 − θ2 )
p2m +(1 − θ2 )
θ2 (1 − θ2 )n−2−m p1m
m
m
m=0
m=0



n−2
n−2 
X n−2
X
n−2 m
m
n−2−m 2
=θ1
θ2 (1 − θ2 )
p1m +(1 − θ1 )
θ2 (1 − θ2 )n−2−m p2m
m
m
m=0
m=0

(14)

Assume θ1 = θ2 , then the left hand side must be greater than the right hand side because
p12m ≥ p21m and p1m ≥ p2m . Since the left hand side is the central player’s expected infection
risk, it must be decreasing in θ2 . To balance the equation, we must raise θ2 . Thus, θ1∗ < θ2∗ .
Note that c̄ here is different from the one in a 3-person star network.
Proposition .25. In a 2-person homogeneous network, if c/D ∈


β, p1∅ , a universal

mandate produces the same expected social welfare a mixed-strategy NE does.
Proof. Recall equation (3.1)
θβD + (1 − θ)[β + (1 − β)βt]D = c,
where the left hand side is a player’s expected payoff if she forgoes the vaccination, and the
right hand side is the vaccination cost. This implies that
θc + (1 − θ){θβD + (1 − θ)[β + (1 − β)βt]D} = c
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(15)

where the left hand side is a player’s expected payoff if she chooses the equilibrium strategy
mixture, and the right hand side is the vaccination cost. Since this equality holds for both
players, the aggregate payoff in a mixed-strategy NE equals 2c, the same payoff under a
universal mandate.
Proposition .26. In a 3-person homogeneous star network, if c/D ∈ (β, c̄), a universal
mandate produces the same expected social welfare as in a mixed-strategy NE.
Proof. Recall equation (3.3)
(θ2 )2 · p1{2,3} D + 2θ2 (1 − θ2 ) · p1{2} D + (1 − θ2 )2 · p1∅ D = c,
and equation (3.4)
θ1 · p2{1} D + (1 − θ1 )θ2 · p2{3} D + (1 − θ1 )(1 − θ2 ) · p2∅ D = c.
They imply that for player 1,


θ1 c + (1 − θ1 ) (θ2 )2 · p1{2,3} D + 2θ2 (1 − θ2 ) · p1{2} D + (1 − θ2 )2 · p1∅ D = c,
and for player 2 and 3,


θ2 c + (1 − θ2 ) θ1 · p2{1} D + (1 − θ1 )θ2 · p2{3} D + (1 − θ1 )(1 − θ2 ) · p2∅ D = c.
Thus, adding up the left hand side of all players, the aggregate payoff in a mixed-strategy
NE equals 3c, the same payoff under a universal mandate.
Proposition .27. For any n-person network, if a mixed-strategy NE exists, a universal
mandate produces the same expected social welfare a mixed-strategy NE does.
Proof. Consider an n-person network with players N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The vector (θ1 , θ2 , ..., θn )
defines a mixed-strategy NE (take the star off the superscript for simplicity). Consider player
i ∈ N . If she takes the vaccine, she pays the cost ci . If she forgoes the vaccine, she faces the
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vaccination set Sk , where i ∈
/ Sk . And her probability of infection is piSk , and her illness cost
is Di .
Player i is facing 2n−1 different Sk because all other players can choose to vaccinate or
not. Thus, label each Sk with k = 1, 2, ..., 2n−1 . Consider player j, j 6= i. Denote Vj = 1 if
j ∈ Sk , and Vj = 0 otherwise. Thus, the probability of a particular Sk to arise is
Y

[Vj θj + (1 − Vj )(1 − θj )] .

j∈N,j6=i

Then multiply by player i’s expected infection cost, her expected illness cost facing Sk is
Y

[Vj θj + (1 − Vj )(1 − θj )] piSk Di .

j∈N,j6=i

In a mixed-strategy NE, player i must be indifferent between vaccinating and not:
n−1
2X

Y

[Vj θj + (1 − Vj )(1 − θj )] piSk Di = ci ,

k=1 j∈N,j6=i

where the left hand side is her expected illness cost if she forgoes vaccination. Since player i
chooses the strategy profile (θi , 1 − θi ), then her expected payoff equals the vaccination cost
in the equilibrium

θi ci + (1 − θi )

n−1
2X

Y

[Vj θj + (1 − Vj )(1 − θj )] piSk Di = ci .

k=1 j∈N,j6=i

And such equality holds for everyone. Hence, the aggregate payoff of all players must equal
the cost of vaccinating everyone, that is
n
X
i=1

(
θi ci + (1 − θi )

n−1
2X

)
Y

[Vj θj + (1 − Vj )(1 − θj )] piSk Di

=

n
X

ci .

(16)

i=1

k=1 j∈N,j6=i

To conclude, the social cost of a mixed-strategy NE equals the cost of a universal mandate.

102

C

Appendix

C.1

The Construction of Centrality

We apply the principal component analysis to the Occupational Information Network
(O*NET) data to construct the occupation centrality. The principal component analysis
is an unsupervised machine learning technique to reduce the dimensions of a dataset.
Principle component analysis converts a set of possibly correlated variables into a set of
linearly uncorrelated variables. We call these linearly uncorrelated variables the “principal
components”. Specifically, we construct the occupation centrality in six steps:
1. We select 22 descriptors from Occupational Information Network (O*NET) that are
related to disease exposure and interpersonal interactions. Table 2 presents summary
statistics of the descriptors.
2. The O*NET dataset contains 967 8-digit specific occupation codes using the 2010
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). We first collapse these 8-digit codes into
6-digit codes by taking a simple average and obtain descriptors for 770 occupations.
Then we transform them into 2000 SOC using the crosswalk guide provided by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3. The 2013 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) dataset contains 494
unique occupations. We merge the BRFSS dataset with the transformed O*NET
dataset and find 335 matched occupations, which are mostly specific occupations. The
unmatched occupations are mostly coded as minor groups and broad occupations (SOC
trailing in zeros) or miscellaneous occupations (SOC trailing in nines).
4. We take the simple average of descriptors of specific occupations under the same
general group to impute values for minor occupation groups, broad occupations, and
miscellaneous occupations. Then we merge the BRFSS dataset with the imputed
O*NET dataset and find 157 matches. We drop two occupations in BRFSS: Legislators
(11-1031) because O*NET does not collect the information and Textile Bleaching and
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Dyeing Machine Operators and Tenders (51-6061) because BRFSS does not have all
variables we need. Thus, we obtain descriptors for 492 occupations in BRFSS.
5. We apply the principal component analysis to the 22 descriptors and retain the first
principal component as the centrality score. The centrality score represents 47% of
all variations of the 22 descriptors. Figure C.1 displays the proportion of variance
explained by each principal component.

Figure C.1: The Proportion of Variance Explained by Every Principal Component with
the First Principal Component as the Centrality
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C.2

Additional Tables and Figures
Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Additional Variables
Variable
Centrality (Context)
Centrality (Activity)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

0.53
0.68

1.50
2.89

-7.11
-7.89

3.73
8.82

Source: O*NET.
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Table C.2: The Bin Model Estimates of the Effect of Centrality (Context) on Flu Vaccine
Uptake
Dependent: Flu Vaccine Uptake
(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Full Sample

(3)
Full Sample

(4)
Non-HCP

(5)
Age 18-64

-0.2802∗∗
(0.0789)
-0.3229∗∗∗
(0.0252)
-0.0960∗
(0.0421)
-0.0898∗∗
(0.0273)
-0.0720∗
(0.0255)
-0.0715∗∗∗
(0.0138)
-0.0328∗∗∗
(0.0079)
-0.0309∗∗
(0.0098)
0.0289
(0.0150)
0.2345∗∗∗
(0.0161)
0.2247∗∗∗
(0.0299)

-0.2299∗∗∗
(0.0508)
-0.2769∗∗∗
(0.0486)
-0.0194
(0.0499)
-0.0552∗
(0.0259)
-0.0176
(0.0189)
-0.0101
(0.0144)
-0.0018
(0.0090)
-0.0245∗
(0.0092)
0.0163
(0.0168)
0.1863∗∗∗
(0.0109)
0.1877∗∗∗
(0.0253)

-0.2053∗∗∗
(0.0441)
-0.2670∗∗∗
(0.0429)
-0.0074
(0.0477)
-0.0472
(0.0261)
-0.0189
(0.0201)
-0.0071
(0.0155)
-0.0010
(0.0105)
-0.0247∗
(0.0093)
-0.0312
(0.0170)
0.0608∗∗
(0.0198)
0.2339
(0.1238)

Constant

0.3392∗∗∗
(0.0161)

0.0349
(0.0214)

-0.2270∗∗∗
(0.0509)
-0.2694∗∗∗
(0.0445)
-0.0106
(0.0478)
-0.0468
(0.0257)
-0.0142
(0.0185)
-0.0096
(0.0143)
-0.0029
(0.0086)
-0.0268∗∗
(0.0088)
-0.0234
(0.0152)
0.0737∗∗∗
(0.0106)
0.0280
(0.0306)
0.1938∗∗∗
(0.0104)
0.0449
(0.0228)

0.0484∗
(0.0231)

-0.2571∗∗∗
(0.0099)
-0.2415∗∗∗
(0.0372)
-0.0026
(0.0540)
-0.0532
(0.0266)
-0.0085
(0.0165)
-0.0078
(0.0160)
0.0004
(0.0090)
-0.0265∗∗
(0.0081)
-0.0247
(0.0147)
0.0772∗∗∗
(0.0123)
0.0400
(0.0312)
0.2035∗∗∗
(0.0107)
0.0453
(0.0243)

Controls
State Fixed Effects

No
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Observations

75712

75712

75712

63715

68152

Centrality (Context)
[−7, −6)
[−6, −5)
[−5, −4)
[−4, −3)
[−3, −2)
[−2, −1)
[−1, 0)
[1, 2)
[2, 3)
[3, 4)
[4, 5)
Health Care Personnel

Source: BRFSS 2013 and O*NET. Controls include gender, age group, race/ethnicity group,
income level, marital status, and indicators for health care personnel, high-risk conditions,
having personal health care provider, and having medical insurance. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ means that
the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All models
weighted with BRFSS weights. Standard errors clustered at the state-level and reported in
parentheses.
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Table C.3: The Bin Model Estimates of the Effect of Centrality (Activity) on Flu Vaccine
Uptake
Dependent: Flu Vaccine Uptake
(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Full Sample

(3)
Full Sample

(4)
Non-HCP

(5)
Age 18-64

-0.0517
(0.2119)
-0.0755∗
(0.0343)
-0.1888∗∗∗
(0.0249)
-0.0750∗∗∗
(0.0195)
-0.0341
(0.0250)
-0.0776∗∗∗
(0.0127)
-0.0489∗∗∗
(0.0100)
-0.0127
(0.0144)
-0.0298
(0.0145)
0.1193∗∗
(0.0319)
0.0238∗
(0.0089)
0.1061∗∗∗
(0.0121)
0.0405
(0.0250)
0.0969∗∗
(0.0267)
-0.0753
(0.0739)
0.0989
(0.0591)

-0.0487
(0.1538)
-0.0720
(0.0363)
-0.1576∗∗∗
(0.0349)
-0.0213
(0.0204)
-0.0138
(0.0250)
-0.0471∗∗
(0.0130)
-0.0341∗∗
(0.0099)
-0.0210
(0.0135)
-0.0307∗∗
(0.0107)
0.0602
(0.0290)
-0.0443∗∗∗
(0.0090)
0.0393∗∗
(0.0124)
-0.0283
(0.0209)
-0.0052
(0.0292)
-0.0732
(0.0536)
0.0382
(0.0518)

-0.0005
(0.1616)
-0.0323
(0.0378)
-0.1049∗∗
(0.0284)
0.0117
(0.0223)
0.0302
(0.0319)
-0.0060
(0.0181)
0.0089
(0.0146)
0.0156
(0.0174)
0.0090
(0.0175)
0.0644
(0.0317)
0.0052
(0.0149)
0.0156
(0.0167)
0.0134
(0.0315)
0.0076
(0.0398)
-0.0257
(0.0587)
0.0942
(0.0501)

Constant

0.3313∗∗∗
(0.0201)

0.0457
(0.0254)

0.0134
(0.1580)
-0.0212
(0.0368)
-0.1004∗∗
(0.0303)
0.0177
(0.0180)
0.0328
(0.0259)
-0.0054
(0.0155)
0.0158
(0.0118)
0.0243
(0.0155)
0.0168
(0.0125)
0.0795∗
(0.0303)
0.0092
(0.0109)
0.0357∗∗
(0.0120)
0.0080
(0.0248)
0.0074
(0.0300)
-0.0208
(0.0551)
0.1008
(0.0516)
0.2149∗∗∗
(0.0087)
0.0218
(0.0275)

0.0314
(0.0311)

0.0833
(0.1728)
-0.0250
(0.0393)
-0.1157∗∗
(0.0356)
0.0181
(0.0164)
0.0355
(0.0253)
-0.0067
(0.0180)
0.0168
(0.0121)
0.0242
(0.0172)
0.0104
(0.0132)
0.0810∗
(0.0299)
0.0117
(0.0116)
0.0345∗
(0.0125)
0.0080
(0.0274)
0.0148
(0.0287)
-0.0272
(0.0589)
0.1076∗
(0.0511)
0.2256∗∗∗
(0.0085)
0.0249
(0.0277)

Controls
State Fixed Effects

No
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Observations

75712

75712

75712

63715

68152

Centrality (Activity)
[−8, −7)
[−7, −6)
[−6, −5)
[−5, −4)
[−4, −3)
[−3, −2)
[−2, −1)
[−1, 0)
[1, 2)
[2, 3)
[3, 4)
[4, 5)
[5, 6)
[6, 7)
[7, 8)
[8, 9)
Health Care Personnel

Source: BRFSS 2013 and O*NET. Controls include gender, age group, race/ethnicity group,
income level, marital status, and indicators for health care personnel, high-risk conditions,
having personal health care provider, and having medical insurance. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ means that the
coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All models weighted
with BRFSS weights. Standard errors clustered at the state-level and reported in parentheses.
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Figure C.2: Coefficient Estimates of Centrality Bins in Table 4. Column (1)

Figure C.3: Coefficient Estimates of Centrality Bins in Table 4. Column (2)
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Figure C.4: Coefficient Estimates of Centrality Bins in Table 4. Column (3)

Figure C.5: Coefficient Estimates of Centrality Bins in Table 4. Column (4)
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Figure C.6: Coefficient Estimates of Centrality Bins in Table 4. Column (5)
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